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INTRODUCTION
Economists and policymakers have long recognized that
unless the tax law incorporates corrective measures, price infla-
tion can greatly magnify the effective rate of taxation on in-
come from capital. Inflation magnifies the apparent "gain"
enjoyed by holders of appreciated property, often to the extent
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of creating taxable income when no economic income exists.
Inflation, moreover, diminishes the real value of depreciation
allowances,1 depriving the asset owner of deductions for the
full economic costs of doing business.
To remedy this problem, the Treasury Department's 1984
tax reform plan,2 on which Congress in part based the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986,3 proposed a system for "indexing" various
components of the tax code to adjust for the effects of future
price changes. The Treasury plan would have permitted the
owner of a capital asset to increase the asset's historical cost
"basis" each yea for inflation, so that capital gain reflected
only the asset's real increase in value. Similarly, the plan
would have adjusted depreciation allowances each year to re-
flect changes in the value of the dollar over time. As ulti-
mately enacted, however, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
incorporated none of the Treasury's price adjustment mecha-
nisms, 4 leaving the political accord on which Congress based
the current Code vulnerable to accelerations of inflation in the
future.
The rejection of indexation in the 1986 Act reflects a
number of concerns. Most importantly, while inflation in-
creases the tax burden on capital gains and on income from de-
preciable property, inflation also confers tax benefits on
debtors, who enjoy economic income from the shrinkage in the
real value of their repayment obligations without any corre-
sponding tax cost. Thus, taxpayers who have financed capital
assets or depreciable property with debt arguably should not
benefit from indexation of capital gains or of depreciation al-
lowances. The practical difficulties of limiting indexation only
to holders of equity-financed assets, or more ambitiously, as
proposed in the Treasury plan,5 adjusting all taxpayers' interest
payments and receipts to remove the distortions of inflation,
have posed a significant impediment to attempts to adjust the
tax base for inflation.
Other impediments are political in nature, including an ap-
parent concern among some advocates of tax preferences for
1. The tax laws generally base depreciation allowances on an asset's his-
torical cost "basis," without adjustment for inflation since the time the tax-
payer purchased the asset. See infra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
2. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOmIC GROWTH (1984) [hereinafter U.S. TREASURY DEP'T].
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
4. See infra notes 56-64, 107-16 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
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capital formation that allowing indexation might divert polit-
ical attention from other, potentially stronger, investment in-
centives. 6 Faced with this and other difficulties, Congress to
date has rejected the incorporation of inflation adjustments
into the Code,7 relying instead on lawmakers' ability to revise
the Code periodically to adjust to changes in the rate of
inflation.
This approach may reflect a failure to recognize the full
economic and political significance of inflation's effects on the
tax burden on income from capital. It also may result from an
exaggerated perception of the administrative and political diffi-
culties of providing asset owners with some "Measure of insur-
ance against the tax effects of inflation. Especially in a period
of serious concern for federal revenues, the provision of some
measure of inflation protection can respond to the most intel-
lectually compelling demands for relief from taxation of in-
come from capital, while avoiding the potentially more
expensive alternative of across-the-board capital incentives. A
limited degree of inflation protection would offer taxpayers a
less volatile investment environment, and also could mitigate
the political instability that has afflicted the tax code during
the past decade.
Part I of this Article reviews the economic arguments that
analysts have raised in favor of indexation of depreciation al-
lowances and capital gains. It focuses both on the massive dis-
tortions of tax burdens that inflation can impose on holders of
equity-financed assets, and on the difficulties of indexing when
assets are debt-financed. This portion of the discussion gives at-
tention to the situation of owners of "venture capital" enter-
prises-a situation that policymakers sometimes misun-
derstand, and which thus raises a special threat of inappropri-
ate tax legislation.
Part II discusses the political consequences of the lack of
an indexation system. The discussion concludes that an acceler-
ation of inflation would upset the political balance underlying
the current Code, and would very possibly open the Code to yet
another wholesale revision.
Part III examines a number of factors that apparently have
led to the rejection of indexation measures in the past. These
factors include normative arguments against indexing, which
6. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
7. Very recently, however, legislators have expressed renewed interest in
indexing. See, e.g., infra note 181 and accompanying text.
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suggest that Congress should limit any policy of indexation, but
which are insufficient to justify the complete rejection of ex-
plicit indexation mechanisms in the 1986 Act. The discussion
also addresses the possibility that an interest in tax instability
on the part of various participants in the tax legislative process
has contributed to the rejection of indexation mechanisms.
This possibility does not in itself undermine the normative ar-
guments against indexation, but it suggests that Congress may
have given those arguments more deference than they warrant.
The Article concludes generally that a "safety valve" ap-
proach to partial indexation of the tax base could protect asset-
holders from the most serious potential distortions of inflation,
while at the same time responding to many of the economic
and political factors that may render full indexation infeasible.
The safety-valve approach, based in part on a measure proposed
in the House version of the 1986 Act, would provide for infla-
tion adjustments only to the extent that inflation significantly
exceeds the level legislators presupposed in reaching the polit-
ical accommodation reflected in the Act. The proposal offered
here departs from the House version in a novel fashion, how-
ever, by making the safety-valve adjustment available only to
asset-owners who accept a partial indexation of interest deduc-
tions, effectively limiting the availability of inflation adjust-
ments to the extent that assets are debt-financed. This
approach responds to the concerns associated with debt financ-
ing without the need for cumbersome attribution rules, such as
those requiring the "tracing" of debt obligations to particular
depreciable or capital assets." Congress could employ the pro-
posed election in connection with a wide range of policies to-
ward the taxation of income from capital, including the full
indexation of capital gains and depreciation, or implicit indexa-
tion through accelerated depreciation or a capital gains
preference.
The Article's approach should be adaptable to the problem
of unindexed depreciation allowances without serious technical
difficulty, and the Article proposes that Congress incorporate
safety-valve protections into the Code's current depreciation
provisions at the earliest opportunity. The design of inflation
protection mechanisms for the capital gain provisions is more
difficult. Nevertheless, by applying the principles underlying
the safety-valve approach to depreciation allowances, this Arti-
cle suggests mechanisms that might render a future capital
8. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
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gains policy more satisfactory on both economic and political
grounds.
I. THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON CAPITAL GAINS,
DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES, AND
LOAN BALANCES
A. CAPITAL GAINS
1. The Effects of Inflation on the Measurement of Capital
Gains
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 represents, in broad outline, a
movement closer to an "accretion" model of the tax base, ac-
cording to which taxable income consists of every increment to
the taxpayer's net wealth during the year.9 Under the accre-
tion model, the theoretically proper treatment of capital gain is
clear: to the extent that a taxpayer owns assets that have in-
creased in value during the taxable year, the taxpayer has en-
joyed an accession to wealth and therefore has income subject
to taxation.10
In practice, Congress never has sought to conform the tax
code to this theoretically pure treatment of capital gain. A true
accretion system would impose a tax on capital gains each year
as those gains accrue, whether or not the taxpayer sells an asset
during the taxable year. 1 In practice, the Code imposes a tax
only when the owner sells the asset, at which time the Code
imposes a tax on the taxpayer's full profit from the asset, as
measured by the difference between the amount realized on
the sale and the asset's original cost, or "basis.1 2 If, for exam-
ple, a taxpayer purchases a painting for $1000 in Year 1 and
sells it for $1100 in Year 2, the taxpayer has earned gross in-
9. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938), represents the most
commonly cited statement of the accretion model. See generally Goode, The
Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 1 (J.
Pechman ed. 1977) (offering historical analysis of accretion model). Commen-
tators often contrast the accretion model with a competing "consumption tax"
model of the tax base, a fact that has affected policymaking significantly. See
generally Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1145-65 (1974) (comparing accretion and consumption
models of tax base); see also infra text accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing
consumption-tax approach to depreciation).
10. Cf. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual
Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1111-18 (1986) (describing theoretical frame-
work for capital gains taxation under accretion model).
11. Id.
12. I.R.C. § 1001 (West 1989).
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come of $100-the difference between the amount realized of
$1100 and the basis of $1000.
Price inflation can create enormous distortions in measur-
ing gross income from capital gains--distortions that do not
arise when measuring income from the performance of serv-
ices.13 Consider first, as a "baseline," the situation of a tax-
payer who earns a salary of $40,000 in Year 1. If this income is
taxed at an average rate of twenty-five percent, the taxpayer
will pay a tax of $10,000. If, between Year 1 and Year 2, infla-
tion occurs at a rate of ten percent, and if the taxpayer's wages
increase to keep pace with inflation, the taxpayer's nominal
earnings during Year 2 will be $44,000 and the tax, again im-
posed at a rate of twenty-five percent, will be $11,000. The real
value of this $11,000 of tax in terms of lost purchasing power
will be precisely equal to that of the $10,000 paid in tax in the
previous year. Inflation will not have changed the taxpayer's
real tax burden at all.
Under a progressive system of taxation, that is, one in
which tax rates increase with the taxpayer's income, inflation
could adversely affect the taxpayer by "bumping" the taxpayer
into a higher tax bracket. In that circumstance, inflation would
increase the taxpayer's real burden by increasing the rate that
the taxpayer pays on income that has not increased in real
value. In legislation enacted in 1981, however, Congress elimi-
nated this problem of "bracket creep" by indexing the rate
brackets to prevent inflation from affecting the tax rate-and
thus the real tax burden-on the taxpayer's income from
wages.14
The situation of the taxpayer who earns income from the
appreciation of capital assets differs significantly.1 5 Consider
13. The general effect of inflation on the computation of capital gains is
well known. For a useful introductory discussion, see, for example, R. GOODE,
THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 183-86 (1976); see also H. SIMONS, supra note 9,
at 155-56.
14. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 104, 95
Stat. 172, 188-90; see also I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 1(g)(4) (West 1989) (indexing "cutoff"
points in rate brackets themselves); id. § 151(d)(3) (indexing level of personal
exemption); id. § 63(c)(4) (indexing level of standard deduction).
"Bracket creep" is "[t]he situation in which incomes rise due to inflation,
and that rise puts taxpayers in higher income tax brackets so that a large per-
centage of their income is automatically paid to governments." D. MOFFAT,
ECONOMICS DICTIONARY 32 (2d ed. 1983).
15. Virtually all discussions of inflation and the tax code point to the con-
ceptual independence of bracket indexation from indexation of capital gains,
depreciation allowances, and other elements of the tax base. See, e.g., Brinner,
Inflation and the Definition of Taxable Personal Income, in INFLATION AND
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again the situation of the taxpayer who purchases a painting for
$1000 in Year 1. Assume also that in a year in which neither
inflation nor deflation occurs, the painting increases in value to
$1100.16 If the taxpayer sells the painting at the end of the
year, the taxpayer will have gross income of $100 and, assuming
a tax rate of twenty-five percent, the taxpayer will owe a tax of
$25.
Assume now, however, that in addition to a real increase in
the painting's value from $1000 to $1100, the economy exper-
iences general price inflation during the year of ten percent.
The nominal value of the painting then will be $1210-its new
real value of $1100, inflated by an additional ten percent to re-
flect the change in the value of the currency. If the taxpayer
now sells the painting, the taxpayer will have taxable income of
$210: the amount realized of $1210 minus the basis of $1000.
Assuming the tax rate remains unchanged at twenty-five per-
cent, the taxpayer will owe a tax of $52.50. Inflation of only ten
percent thus increases the taxpayer's liability by more than 100
percent, from $25 to $52.50.
This distortion arises from the anomaly of measuring the
amount realized in nominal, inflated currency units, while mea-
suring the taxpayer's cost in pre-inflation currency units. This
procedure is no more valid theoretically than would be an at-
tempt to measure the amount realized in Italian lire and the
taxpayer's cost in French francs. Proper measurement of the
taxpayer's income requires that the Code measure both the tax-
payer's gross receipts (the amount realized) and the taxpayer's
costs of earning income (the amount the taxpayer originally
paid for the capital asset) in the same unit of currency.
Although it is perhaps natural to view inflation as a prob-
lem of importance only over the long term, inflation can seri-
ously distort the measurement of gain even from assets held for
only short periods of time. During the course of a single year,
for example, the real increase in an asset's value might amount
to only six percent, while inflation might reach ten percent.
Most of the apparent gain from the asset over this short period
actually would be the result of inflation.' 7 Indeed, if both the
THE INCOME TAx 125 (H. Aaron ed. 1976); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, RE-
VISING THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 67-70 (1983) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE].
16. The increase might result, for example, from changing critical percep-
tions of the artist's work.
17. If, for example, the taxpayer purchased the asset at the beginning of
the year for $100, its total nominal value at the end of the year would be $116,
1224 [Vol. 73:1217
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asset's real increase in value and the rate of inflation remain
constant over the asset's life, the proportion of the apparent
gain from an asset attributable to inflation actually is greater
the shorter the asset's holding period. 8
The tax laws can remove the distortion of inflation by in-
dexing the asset's tax basis'-Pthat is, by increasing the basis
each year to account for inflation, so that at any given time the
basis reflects up-to-date currency units. The painting consid-
ered above would have an indexed basis of $1100 at the time of
reflecting both the real growth of six percent and the inflation of ten percent.
Ten-sixteenths (more than sixty percent) of the "gain" would be illusory.
18. For formal proof of this proposition, see Brinner, supra note 15, at 127
n.7.
As an example, consider two assets that the taxpayer purchased originally
for $100. The taxpayer holds one for one year and the other for five years.
Throughout the holding periods of both assets, the annual rate of growth in
the assets' real value is four percent and the annual rate of inflation is six per-
cent. The asset held for one year will produce an apparent capital gain of ten
dollars, of which six dollars-sixty percent-results from the distortion of in-
flation. The owner of the asset held for five years will have an apparent capi-
tal gain of $61.05, that is, the asset's new value of $100 X 1.10', or $161.05,
minus the taxpayer's original cost of $100. Of this amount, the inflationary
gain, that is, the increase in the asset's price attributable solely to inflation,
equals 100 > 1.06 s - 100, or $33.82, which is 55.3% of the apparent gain of
$61.11. While the distortion arising from inflation remains serious for the as-
set held for five years, it is proportionally more serious for the asset held for
only one year.
This phenomenon can be understood intuitively by observing that infla-
tion's magnification of apparent capital gain arises from a failure to adjust the
asset's basis from year to year for inflation. If an asset is experiencing real
growth as well as inflationary growth, the asset's basis-even if adjusted for
inflation-will comprise a progressively smaller proportion of the asset's mar-
ket value each year. As basis becomes a progressively smaller fraction of the
asset's value, a failure to adjust basis for inflation becomes relatively less sig-
nificant.
The author is grateful to Charlotte Crane for discussion of this point.
19. See 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 178-88.
The problem of inflation arises not only with respect to "capital" assets,
which tax-payers typically hold for appreciation over the relatively long term,
but also with respect to inventory assets that taxpayers purchase for sale in
the ordinary course of a trade or business. The Code generally addresses the
problem of inflation accounting for inventory by permitting taxpayers to use a
"last in first out" ("LIFO") method of inventory accounting. I.R.C. § 472
(West 1989). The use of LIFO helps to offset the effects of inflation when the
taxpayer maintains a steady schedule of inventory accumulation and sales.
LIFO, however, is far from precise, a situation that has prompted suggestions
for reform. See, e.g., 2 U.S. TREAsURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 189-92. This Ar-
ticle does not address the problem of inflation indexation of inventories,
although the principles raised in the discussion of capital gains are applicable
to the problem of inventories. Cf. i&. at 191-92 (proposing more precise
method of indexation for inventories).
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sale-the original basis of $1000 multiplied by 1.10 to reflect the
inflation of ten percent. Gross income from the sale of the
painting would be $110, the difference between the amount re-
alized of $1210 and the indexed basis of $1100. The tax would
be $27.50, twenty-five percent of $110-ten percent more than
the pre-inflation tax of $25.00, which is exactly the result re-
quired to place the seller in a position equivalent to that of the
taxpayer who earns income from wages.
2. Factors Other Than Inflation Affecting Capital
Gains Policy
In fact, the situation is much more complicated than the
simple example used above might suggest. Leaving aside for
the moment the difficulties that arise when taxpayers finance
capital assets with debt, the most serious complication results
from the taxpayer's ability to defer taxation under the rule of
realization. Although a true accretion system would impose a
tax each year on increments in an asset's value as those incre-
ments accrue, the rule of realization permits the asset-owner to
postpone tax on all increments of value until the taxpayer
chooses to sell the asset.20 Moreover, under provisions that
often are criticized, but which to date have withstood attempts
at repeal, if the taxpayer holds an asset until death the asset re-
ceives a new, market-value basis, commonly called a "stepped
up" basis, in the hands of the taxpayer's successor.21 Thus, the
Code effectively forgives taxes on capital gains accrued during
the taxpayer's lifetime.22
The benefits from deferring taxation of accrued capital
gains generally will increase the longer the taxpayer holds the
asset. Ultimately, the benefits from deferral will outweigh the
negative effects of inflation on the taxpayer, although the tax-
payer probably will reach this point only after a very long hold-
ing period.23 The value of deferral is, of course, much greater if
20. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
21. I.R.C. § 1014 (West 1989).
22. Suppose, for example, that a taxpayer purchased corporate stock in
1932 for $1000 and holds the stock until the taxpayer's death in 1989, when the
stock is worth $100,000. The taxpayer's successor would take the stock with a
new basis of $100,000, thereby obtaining forgiveness of taxation on the $99,000
of unrealized gain. See, e.g., 2 B. BirKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, Es-
TATES AND GIFTs AA 41.4 - 41.5 (1981 & Supp. 1988); Note, Carryover Basis:
The Case for Repeal, 57 TEx. L. REV. 204, 214-24 (1979).
23. A comparison of the amounts that a taxpayer would retain after tax at
the ends of holding periods of varying lengths, on the sale of an asset
purchased originally for $100, under accrual taxation with inflation adjust-
1226 [Vol. 73:1217
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the taxpayer dies before selling the asset, so that capital gain
taxes are forgiven. Despite the high value of deferral in many
circumstances, it is very unlikely that, in the aggregate, the
benefits of deferral compensate taxpayers for the detriment of
inflation. Nevertheless, the existence of deferral makes it im-
possible to obtain a truly "neutral" result simply by indexing
asset basis for inflation.24
ments and under realization taxation without inflation adjustments, illustrates
this point. The following table assumes that the asset's value increases in real
terms at a constant five-percent annual rate, that inflation also occurs at a con-
stant five-percent annual rate, and that all gains are subject to taxation at the
rate of 25%:
Amount Amount
Holding Period Taxpayer Retains Taxpayer Retains
Under Accrual Under Realization
Taxation With Taxation Without
(Years) Inflation Adjustments Inflation Adjustments
5 $152 $121
10 231 195
15 352 313
20 535 505
25 814 813
30 1,238 1,309
This taxpayer would reach the "break-even" point-when the benefits of
deferral outweigh the effects of inflation-after holding the asset for between
25 and 30 years, with the break-even point occurring between the 25th and
26th years.
In the table, the amount the taxpayer retains under accrual taxation
with inflation adjustments is computed according to the formula
X = A [l+p+(1-t)r", where X equals the amount retained by the taxpayer,
A equals the asset's original value, p equals the rate of inflation, t equals the
rate of taxation, r equals the asset's real rate of growth, and n equals the
length of the holding period. The amount the taxpayer retains under realiza-
tion taxation without inflation adjustments is computed according to the
formula X = A(1-t)(1+p+r)', using the same definitions.
For more extensive discussions of the relative magnitudes of the effects of
inflation and deferral, under various assumed rates of inflation and real inter-
est rates, see Brinner, Inflation, Deferral and the Neutral Taxation of Capital
Gains, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 565, 565-74 (1973); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 15, at 72-81.
24. The need to take account of losses, as well as gains, further compli-
cates the task of achieving truly neutral taxation. Just as increases in an as-
set's value, under the accretion model, should increase the taxpayer's income
subject to taxation, declines in the value of an asset diminish the taxpayer's
net worth and should lessen the taxpayer's income subject to tax. The Code
applies the rule of realization to losses as well as to gains, so that just as the
taxpayer must include realized gains in gross income, I.R.C. § 61 (West 1989),
the taxpayer may deduct realized losses, I.R.C. § 165 (West 1989).
Strict adherence to this system would give the taxpayer an enormous ad-
vantage, because the taxpayer would be free to defer taxation of gains indefi-
nitely by delaying asset dispositions, while disposing of assets promptly to
1989] 1227
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The competing effects of inflation and deferral are not the
only factors that have affected the formulation of capital gains
policy. Commentators and policymakers have raised many
arguments for taxing capital gains more leniently than a simple
application of the accretion model suggests, and several of these
arguments continue to exert a strong influence on
policymaking.25
First, under the rule of realization, very large unrealized
capital gains-with correspondingly high potential tax liabili-
ties-can accrue over time. These potential tax liabilities can
deter investors from adjusting their portfolios to take account
of changing economic conditions. This "lock-in" will more seri-
ously affect assets held for relatively long periods of time.
26
The lock-in effect is simply a by-product of a realization regime
realize any accrued losses. To limit this opportunity, the Code permits taxpay-
ers to deduct capital losses during a year only to the extent of the taxpayer's
capital gains during that year, plus an additional $3000 allowance for
noncorporate taxpayers. I.R.C. § 1211 (West 1989). The taxpayer generally
can carry unused losses forward to a subsequent year in which the taxpayer
has capital gains. I.R.C. § 1212 (West 1989).
These capital loss disallowance rules do not wholly eliminate the advan-
tages that taxpayers can enjoy by pursuing a policy of realizing losses cur-
rently but deferring gains indefinitely. At least to the extent that the
taxpayer's total gain over time exceeds the taxpayer's losses, the taxpayer is
able to realize substantial tax benefits from capital losses, by using these losses
to offset any capital gains that the taxpayer chooses to realize, while deferring
indefinitely the taxation of any remaining net gains. The $3000 "free allow-
ance" further enhances the taxpayer's ability to benefit from a policy of realiz-
ing losses promptly while deferring realization of gains.
25. For a useful historical summary of arguments in favor of preferential
treatment of capital gains, see Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains
Arguments, 35 TAXEs 247, 247-66 (1957). Some of the early arguments appear
spurious by contemporary standards and no longer affect policymaking signifi-
cantly: for example, the argument that capital gains should be classed as ac-
cretions to "capital" rather than as "income." Cf. id. at 248-49. This Article
limits discussion to arguments that continue to figure prominently in policy
deliberations. For brief summaries of these arguments, see STAFF OF THE
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., 1ST SESs., TAX TREATMENT OF CAPI-
TAL GAINS AND LOSSES 18-29 (Jt. Comm. Print 1989) [hereinafter STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION]; M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 675-
79 (2d ed. 1988).
26. An investor will choose to dispose of an asset when an alternative in-
vestment offers the prospect of greater return over time. The investor will
make the change, however, only when the additional value of the proposed
new investment exceeds the tax cost of disposing of the old investment. See
Gravelle & Lindsey, Capital Gains, 38 TAX NOTES 397, 402-03 (1988); see also
infra text accompanying notes 171-77 (discussing pending legislative debate
over capital gains policy). At least when increases in asset value tend to out-
weigh decreases over time, the tax cost of disposing of the old investment will
tend to increase the longer the taxpayer holds the asset.
[Vol. 73:12171228
INFLATION AND THE TAX CODE
that offers substantial incentives to hold capital assets by offer-
ing opportunities for deferral. Nevertheless, a concern that
lock-in might cause market stagnation has, over the years, lent
support to the argument that Congress should provide some re-
lief from taxation at the time a taxpayer sells an asset, espe-
cially when the owner has held the asset for a relatively long
period of time.27
Additional support for relief from capital gains taxation
historically has arisen from an explicitly stated desire to pro-
mote savings and investment by lowering the burden of taxa-
tion on income from capital assets.28 While income taxation
probably poses some disincentive to participation in any in-
come-producing activity, the rate of taxation arguably affects
the decision whether to save more than it affects the decision
whether, for example, to adjust the level of one's participation
in the labor force.29 Thus, considerations of economic growth
often have motivated arguments for lighter taxation of capital
gains.
A related motivation for preferential taxation of capital
gains has arisen from the special concerns of investors in rela-
tively risky, "venture capital" operations. The venture capital-
ist is likely to invest in a large number of unsuccessful
businesses, but also will have a few extremely profitable invest-
ments. The appreciation in value of the successful investments
typically will be very large in relation to the invester's out-of-
pocket outlay for the business. In tax terms, the investor's ba-
sis in the investment will be very small compared to the invest-
27. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1978) (referring to
lock-in effect to justify lowering tax rate on capital gains in 1978). The lock-in
effect continues to figure heavily in current debates over capital gains policy.
See, e.g., Gravelle & Lindsey, supra note 26, at 401-03 (reviewing background
and consequences of lock-in effect).
In addition to lock-in effect, the tendency for the rule of realization to
"bunch" capital gains into a single taxable year has lent support to arguments
for preferential taxation of capital gains. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, supra note 25, at 19-20. This argument has figured less promi-
nently in policy debate since the 1986 Act's general "flattening" of the rate
structure. Id. at 20.
28. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 25, at
18-19.
29. The extent to which this is true remains among the most controversial
questions in tax policymaking. For a relatively recent study of views on this
question and their implications for economic policy, see B. BOswORTH, TAX IN-
CENTIVES AND ECONOIC GROWTH 177-204 (1984). The literature on this ques-
tion is extensive and continues to grow rapidly. See, e.g., TAXES AND CAPITAL
FORMATION (M. Feldstein ed. 1987).
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ment's appreciation. Indexation of asset basis therefore will
have little effect, in periods of inflation, on the level of gain
recognized upon disposition of the investment.30
The accretion model generally does not require that gain
from the disposition of venture capital investments be adjusted
for inflation. The venture capitalist's income from a successful
endeavor, which the investor enjoys in the form of increases in
the value of the investment, arises largely from the investor's
personal services in identifying and promoting promising ven-
tures at an early stage.3 1 Congress arguably should tax the ven-
ture capitalist's income, like other income from personal
services, at the time the income accrues. The rule of realiza-
tion, however, permits the venture capitalist to delay taxation
until the investment is sold.
To the extent that the increase in value of a venture capital
investment represents deferred income from personal services,
it is appropriate under the accretion model to permit that in-
crease to grow over time with inflation, until the taxpayer sells
the investment. This will ensure that when an investor chooses
to dispose of an investment, the gain properly will be stated in
the currency units of the year of disposition, instead of the
prior year in which the gain was accrued. Assume, for exam-
ple, that a taxpayer makes a speculative investment of $032 in a
research and development enterprise in Year 1. Suppose also
that the enterprise immediately develops a valuable patent, giv-
30. A principal author of the Treasury Department's 1984 proposal for
capital gains indexation described the reaction of those concerned with ven-
ture capital investments:
Those concerned with entrepreneurship and venture capital in-
vestment took little solace from [the indexation proposal].... Essen-
tially, the argument was that many entrepreneurs who begin
successful new ventures have little basis in their companies. They
also argued that venture capitalists have relatively little basis in in-
vestments that are highly successful. Thus.... inflation adjustment is
of little benefit to either of these groups. Those who were concerned
about this problem took little comfort from the fact that the portfo-
lios of most venture capital investors are sufficiently diversified that
historical rates of return on them vary little from those of more mun-
dane investment portfolios.
McLure, Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1619, 1656 (1986).
31. The income of the conventional investor, unlike that of the venture
capitalist, tends to derive primarily from the value of the material resources
committed to the investment.
32. It is unlikely that a taxpayer actually would have a basis of zero in a
venture capital investment. The current example uses a basis of zero as an ap-
proximation of the situation in which a taxpayer places very little capital out-
lay into an investment in comparison to the gains that are likely if the
investment is successful.
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ing the investment a value of $1,000,000. If the taxpayer sells
the investment immediately, the taxpayer will have a gain of
$1,000,000, resulting in a tax, assuming a marginal tax rate of
twenty-five percent, of $250,000.
Assume now that the taxpayer holds the investment for an
additional year, during which the real value of the enterprise
does not increase further, but during which inflation occurs at a
rate of ten percent. At the end of the second year, the taxpayer
sells the investment at its inflated value of $1,100,000. This will
result in a gain of $1,100,000, yielding a tax of $275,000-an
amount that is equivalent in purchasing power to the tax the
investor would have paid had he or she sold the investment one
year previously. If the tax laws reduced the gain for inflation,
resulting in a gain of only $1,000,000, the investor's tax bill
would be only $250,000 in new, "inflated" dollars, resulting in a
real tax burden that is lower than the burden the investor
would have faced had he or she sold the investment a year ear-
lier. Adjusting the gain for inflation therefore would permit
the investor's real tax burden to shrink.
Despite the absence of a need to adjust venture capital
gains for inflation under the accretion model, venture capital
arguably plays an especially important role in economic growth.
Arguments for tax relief on gains from venture capital-typi-
cally in the form of exclusion from taxable income of a portion
of realized gains-historically have enjoyed a high level of sup-
port.33 Conceptually, the arguments for some relief from taxa-
tion of venture capital gains are unrelated to those for inflation
adjustment of asset basis. Politically, however, venture capital-
ists apparently have feared that if Congress did adopt a compre-
hensive system of indexation, many policymakers would think
they had "solved" the "capital gains problem" and would not
take measures to address the special concerns associated with
venture capital.34
Considerations involving the distribution of wealth make
the formulation of capital gains policy even more complicated.
Income from capital, virtually by definition, is concentrated
among taxpayers with accumulated wealth. An increase in the
level of capital gains taxation therefore could serve as an indi-
33. See McLure, supra note 30, at 1655-56.
34. See Bristol, NTA-TIA Conference Considers the Post Tax Reform
World, 39 TAx NOTES 1027, 1028 (1988) (reporting floor discussion during May
1988 National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America conference).
1989] 1231
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
rect mechanism for augmenting the tax code's progressivity. 35
A policy of permitting the effective rate of taxation on capital
gains to grow as a result of anticipated increases in inflation
may prove attractive to those who favor increased progressivity,
if an explicit policy of more steeply progressive tax rates seems
politically impracticable.
Many of the factors that bear on the formulation of a pol-
icy toward capital gains taxation defy quantitative measure-
ment. Economists disagree sharply, for example, over the
significance of the economic distortions occasioned by "lock-
in,"' 36 as well as over the magnitude and economic importance
of any disincentive to saving that taxes on income from capital
might pose.3 7 The merits and relative significance of distribu-
tional concerns are even less susceptible of quantification. Any
resolution of policy toward capital gains taxation, including the
role of indexation, ultimately must reflect a reconciliation of
competing concerns through the political process. An under-
standing of the potential role of inflation adjustment neverthe-
less can contribute to a more disciplined and constructive
debate.
3. The Code's Historical and Current Approaches
to Capital Gains
Historically, the federal tax laws generally have resolved
the capital gains question by allowing a preferentially low rate
of taxation on income from "long-term" capital gains.38 Thus,
35. See Gravelle & Lindsey, supra note 26, at 401; infra notes 212-13 and
accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., G. ESENWEIN, CAPITAL GAINS TAxATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE RECENT DEBATE 4-5 (CONG. RES. SERVICE IssuE BRIEF, July 13, 1988);
Cook & O'Hare, Issues Relating to the Taxation of Capital Gains, 40 NAT'L
TAX J. 473, 474-77 (1987); Lindsey, Capital Gains Taxes Under the Tax Reform
Act of 1986: Revenue Estimates Under Various Assumptions, 40 NAT'L TAX J.
489, 495-503 (1987); infra text accompanying notes 171-77.
37. See supra note 29.
38. "Long-term" capital gains are those resulting from assets held for
more than a minimum "holding period," which in recent decades the Code has
set at six months, nine months, or one year. See 4 B. BITTKER, supra note 22,
at A-93 to A-99 (summarizing legislative history since 1954.) Congress first
provided a preferential rate for capital gains in the Revenue Act of 1921,
which subjected gains on assets held for longer than two years to taxation at a
flat rate of 12.5%. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 232, 233 (1921).
The 1921 Act generally subjected "ordinary" income to taxation at a maximum
rate of 58%. Id. §§ 210-211, 42 Stat. at 233-37; see generally Wetzler, Recent De-
velopments in U.S. Capital Gains Taxation, in READINGS IN FEDERAL TAXA-
TION 421, 421 (2d ed. 1983) (reprint of 1978 report prepared for Canadian Tax
Foundation, tracing capital gains taxation between 1913 and 1969). The struc-
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for example, before the 1986 Act, Congress permitted individ-
ual taxpayers to deduct from their gross incomes sixty percent
of their net gain from capital assets held for longer than six
months.39 This resulted in a maximum effective tax rate on
long-term capital gains of twenty percent-forty percent of the
maximum rate of fifty percent on "ordinary" income. Congress
subjected corporations to a tax rate of twenty-eight percent on
their net long-term capital gains,40 compared to a maximum
corporate rate of forty-six percent on ordinary income.4 '
Inflation seems to have played little, if any, role in the con-
gressional decision to implement the partial exclusion of long-
term capital gains in the early 1920s. Legislators justified the
policy largely on the basis of lock-in, and by concern over the
bunching effect of the rule of realization under a progressive
rate structure.
42
ture of the capital gains exclusion has varied over time, incorporating from
1934 through 1938, for example, a sliding-scale tax rate on long-term capital
gains, with the rate declining as the asset's holding period lengthened. For an
extensive discussion of the early legislative history of the capital gain provi-
sions, see Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the
Federal Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAx J. 12, 12-32 (1949). For a sum-
mary of the legislative history of the capital gain and loss provisions of the
Code since 1954, see 4 B. BITrKER, supra note 22, at A-93 to A-99.
39. I.R.C. § 1202, repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 301(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2216 (providing for 60% exclusion for long-term capital
gains); I.R.C. § 1222 (West 1989) (establishing holding period). The holding pe-
riod provisions remain in the Code to facilitate reinstitution of preferential
treatment for capital gains in the event Congress deems this desirable in the
future. See infra notds 63-65 and accompanying text. The Code currently sets
the holding period at one year, I.R.C. § 1222 (West 1989), although until De-
cember 31, 1987, the date at which preferential treatment for long-term capital
gains expired under the 1986 Act, the Code set it at six months, Deficit Reduc-
tion Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1011-1012.
The mechanisms for computing long-term capital gains under prior law
were complex and could result in some anomalies. For example, the Code ap-
plied the preferential rate to long-term gains net of all losses, both short- and
long-term. Under this regime, a long-term capital gain might reduce the tax-
payer's ability to deduct short-term losses, which taxpayers generally could de-
duct at the ordinary income rate, so that the marginal rate on the taxpayer's
long-term capital gain effectively equaled the ordinary income rate. See M.
CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 292-93 (5th ed. 1988) (briefly
describing mechanics of pre-1986 capital gain computations).
40. I.R.C. § 1201 (1982), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, §§ 311(a), 1024(c)(14), 100 Stat. 2085, 2219-20, 2408.
41. I.R.C. § 11 (1982), amended by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-154, § 601(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2249.
42. For a discussion of the historical motivations for implementing prefer-
ential treatment of capital gains see generally Wells, supra note 38; 2 B. BITT-
KER, supra note 22, 50.1; see also Halperin & Steuerle, Indexing the Tax
System for Inflation, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID IN-
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By the mid-1970s, however, rapidly accelerating price in-
creases had drawn a great deal of attention to the tendency of
inflation to magnify the effective rate of taxation on capital
gains.4 3 Growing political attention to questions of "capital for-
mation" increased concern with lock-in and with the level of in-
vestment in high-risk enterprises, and added support for
reductions in the taxation of income from capital.44 The House
of Representatives responded by passing a plan for indexing
capital asset basis.45 Congress ultimately rejected the House
plan, however, choosing instead to increase the "exclusion ra-
tio" for long-term capital gains from fifty to sixty percent.
46
Several years later, in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
Congress reduced the maximum marginal tax rate from sev-
enty percent to fifty percent, and retained the 1978 Act's sixty
percent exclusion ratio.4 7 This resulted in a maximum rate of
taxation on long-term capital gains of twenty percent.
The Treasury Department's 1984 tax reform proposals
("Treasury I"),48 which provided much of the foundation for
the 1986 Act, rejected the use of tax relief as a means of en-
couraging particular economic activities, relying instead on a
COME-CONSUMPTION TAx 378-79 (1988) (comments by Richard A. Musgrave)
(noting that "[e]xclusion [of capital gains] did not come about as indexing, but
rather as a way to keep capital income out of the tax base, even when there is
no inflation," and that "[i]nflation became an issue later, and thus some degree
of exclusion served to play the role of indexing").
43. See Wetzler, supra note 38, passim.
44. Id.
45. Revenue Bill of 1978, H.R. 13511, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 404 (as passed
by House and introduced to Senate Aug. 14, 1978); see H.R. REP. No. 95-1445,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 125-32 (1978).
46. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402, 92 Stat. 2763, 2867-68 (1978). The Senate Fi-
nance Committee described its motivation for the change as follows:
The committee believes that the present level of taxes applicable
to capital gains has contributed both to a slower rate of economic
growth than that which otherwise might have been anticipated, and
also to some taxpayers realizing fewer potential gains than they
would have realized if the tax rates had been lower. In some in-
stances, the taxes applicable to capital gains effectively may have
locked some taxpayers into their existing investments....
In addition, the committee believes that an increased capital gains
deduction will tend to offset the effect of inflation by reducing the
amount of gain which is subject to tax.
S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 27, at 192. The Senate passed an increase in the
exclusion ratio to 70%, a figure that was reduced to 60% in conference. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1978); see generally Wet-
zler, supra note 38, at 371-75 (describing legislative actions in 1978).
47. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 102, 95 Stat. 172, 186-87 (1981).
48. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2.
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policy of lower marginal tax rates on income from all sources.
The Treasury plan's goal of measuring real income as precisely
as possible, however, gave rise to a policy of explicit adjustment
for the effects of inflation. Accordingly, Treasury I proposed
the elimination of the capital gains preference, coupled with
the indexation of asset basis to reflect changes in the consumer
price index.49 Explicit indexation, the Treasury argued, would
adjust for price changes much more precisely than the rough
approach of the "exclusion ratio,"50 thereby lessening variations
in the effective rate of taxation on income from assets having
differing ratios of real to inflationary gains.51
The Reagan Administration accepted the Treasury Depart-
ment's proposals only in modified form, and submitted to Con-
gress a revised plan ("Treasury II"),52 which retained the policy
of encouraging capital investment by means of tax preferences
to a substantially greater degree than did Treasury I. Treasury
II retained an "exclusion ratio" for long-term capital gains of
noncorporate taxpayers.53 In proposing retention of the exclu-
sion ratio, the Administration probably acted, at least in part, in
deference to the concerns associated with venture capital. In
addition, to guard against the possibility that unanticipated high
inflation might increase the tax burdens of other taxpayers,
Treasury II offered noncorporate taxpayers, beginning in 1991,
the option of electing indexation as a substitute for the exclu-
sion ratio.54 For corporate taxpayers, Treasury II retained the
prior law's maximum rate on long-term capital gains of twenty-
49. I& at 100-05; id at 178-88.
50. Id. at 101-05.
51. 1&L at 100-03. The Treasury argued that, in view of its proposed across-
the-board reduction in maximum marginal rates, the "rule of realization,"
with its attendant deferral of taxation of income from capital gains, offered
sufficient incentive for capital accumulation:
[Tihe Treasury Department believes that with inflation indexing, re-
duced tax rates, and a rate structure with only a few wide income
brackets there is no need for preferential tax treatment of realized
capital gains, beyond that provided by the substantial benefits of
deferral of tax until gains are realized and the exemption of gains on
assets transferred at death.
Id. at 102.
52. THE PRESIDENT'S TAx PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY (May 1985) [hereinafter TREASURY I].
53. Id at 164-73. The exclusion ratio was reduced from 60% to 50%, in
deference to the overall reduction in marginal tax rates envisioned in the Ad-
ministration plan. The maximum individual rate under the Administration
proposal therefore was 35%, yielding a maximum rate on long-term capital
gains of 17.5%.
54. Id. at 169.
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eight percent, as opposed to a proposed maximum corporate
rate on ordinary income of thirty-three percent.5 The plan did
not afford corporate taxpayers an "indexation option.
'56
The House version of the 1986 Act followed Treasury II's
approach of retaining the exclusion ratio for noncorporate tax-
payers.57 Unlike Treasury II, the House bill did not offer indi-
vidual taxpayers the opportunity to elect explicit indexation in
the event of high inflation in future years. 5  In another depar-
ture from Treasury II, the House bill eliminated entirely the
preferential rate on capital gains of corporations.5 9
The Senate version of the 1986 Act extended the House
bill's cutback of the capital gains preference by eliminating the
preference for individual taxpayers as well as for corpora-
tions.60 The Finance Committee report again expressed the
view that the proposed lowering of maximum marginal rates-
to twenty-seven percent for individuals and thirty-three per-
cent for corporations, under the Senate bil1 1 -rendered prefer-
55. Id. at 168.
56. Id.
57. The House bill provided for an exclusion ratio of 42%, which, coupled
with the bill's maximum individual tax rate of 38%, resulted in a maximum
rate of tax on long-term capital gains of 22.04%. See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 196-97 (1985).
58. In explaining the House bill's retention of a preference for long-term
capital gains of noncorporate taxpayers, the Ways and Means Committee's re-
port refered to the lock-in and capital formation arguments that policymakers
traditionally have used to support a capital gains preference, but made no
mention of the role of inflation. The House report's "Reasons for Change" in
support of the capital gains proposal states in its entirety:
Reduced rates on long-term capital gains of individuals have his-
torically been viewed as alleviating the impact of high individual tax
rates on dispositions of assets that have appreciated in value over
time. The reduced rates may contribute to the efficient allocation of
capital by minimizing the possible "lock-in" effect of higher regular
rates, and may also serve as an incentive to investment.
The committee believes it is desirable to retain a reduced rate for
net capital gains of individuals. In the context of the general reduc-
tion of regular individual tax rates under the bill, however, the com-
mittee does not believe that it is necessary to retain the same degree
of differential between regular rates and capital gains rates as is af-
forded under present law.
Id. at 196.
59. In explanation of this proposal, the House report stated only: "The
committee is of the view that corporate capital gain should not be taxed at
preferential rates. Thus, the bill conforms the corporate capital gains rate
with the regular tax rate for large corporations." Id. at 232.
60. S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 169-70 (1986).
61. Id. at 220.
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ential treatment of capital gains unnecessary.62 Emphasizing
that the elimination of the capital gains preference was to serve
as a "trade-off" for lower rates, the Senate bill provided that
the maximum rate on long-term capital gains for individuals
would remain at twenty-seven percent, even if Congress in-
creased maximum marginal rates in the future.63 Like the
House bill, the Senate bill provided no mechanism for indexing
capital gains for inflation.
As finally enacted, the capital gains provisions of the 1986
Act conformed closely to those of the Senate bill. The 1986 Act
eliminated the long-term capital gains preference for individu-
als as well as for corporations. Thus, the maximum rate on
both long- and short-term capital gains is equal to the maxi-
mum marginal rate on ordinary income-twenty-eight percent
for individuals and thirty-four percent for corporations.6 4 The
revised Code contains provisions indicating that the rates on
long-term capital gains are not to rise, even if maximum margi-
nal rates generally increase in the future.6 5 Congress provided
no indexation for inflation.
In approving the 1986 Act, Congress recognized that the
trade-off of a capital gains preference for lower maximum mar-
ginal rates constituted a fragile political accommodation. In-
deed, the 1986 Act retains the network of technical provisions
that in the past have implemented the preference for long-term
capital gains, "to facilitate reinstatement of a capital gains rate
62. The committee said:
The committee believes that as a result of the bill's reduction of
individual tax rates on such forms of capital income as business prof-
its, interest, dividends, and short-term capital gains, the need to pro-
vide a reduced rate for net capital gain is eliminated. This will result
in a tremendous amount of simplification for many taxpayers since
their tax will no longer depend upon the characterization of income
as ordinary or capital gain. In addition, this will eliminate any re-
quirement that capital assets be held by the taxpayer for any ex-
tended period of time (currently six months) in order to obtain
favorable treatment. This will result in greater willingness to invest
in assets that are freely traded (e.g., stocks).
Id. at 169.
The Senate Finance Committee eliminated the capital gains preference
late in its consideration of the 1986 Act, as committee members increasingly
became convinced that drastically reduced marginal rates constituted the only
political "engine" capable of bringing about successful passage of a reform act.
See J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAx REFORM 226-27 (1987).
63. See S. REP. No. 313, supra note 60, at 169-70.
64. I.R.C. §§ 1(j), 11 (West 1989).
65. I.R.C. §§ 1(j), 1201(a) (West 1989) (setting forth maximum marginal
capital gain rates for individuals and corporations, respectively).
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differential if there is a future tax rate increase. 66
Absent from the conference committee report-and indeed
from any of the congressional reports on the 1986 Act-is ex-
plicit mention of accelerating inflation as another possible
source of breakdown of the economic and political accord on
which Congress based the 1986 Act. The 1986 Act eliminated
the long-term capital gains preference at a time when inflation
was much lower than it had been during the 1970s and early
1980s. 67 The trade-off of the elimination of the capital gains
preference, in return for lower marginal rates, may have been
attractive to asset holders on the assumption that price levels
would continue to rise at relatively modest rates. Should infla-
tion increase markedly, however, effective rates of taxation on
many taxpayers' capital gains would increase dramatically.
This could lead to economic burdens and political demands that
the drafters of the 1986 Act did not foresee, contributing to the
reopening of the tax revision process once again.68
B. DEPRECIATION
1. Inflation's Magnification of the Tax Burden on Income
from Depreciable Assets
Under an accretion-model system, the tax laws would per-
mit the taxpayer to deduct all of the economic costs of earning
66. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-107 (1986). Even if
the possibility of reinstating a long-term capital gains preference in the future
had not concerned Congress, it would have needed to retain many "capital
gain" provisions to facilitate the continued limitations on the deductibility of
capital losses. See supra note 24; cf Note, Capital Loss Deduction Limits After
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 66 TEX. L. REv. 159, 179-80 (1987) (suggesting revi-
sions to current rules limiting capital losses). The 1986 Act, however, retains
many provisions aimed solely at distinguishing between long-term and short-
term gains. These provisions are of little current importance, but would be es-
sential if Congress were to reinstitute the pre-1986 capital gains preference.
But see I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) (West 1989) (continuing to distinguish between long-
term capital assets and other property in limiting deductions for certain assets
contributed to charitable organizations).
67. From 1973 to 1982, consumer price inflation occurred at an average an-
nual rate of approximately nine percent. In contrast, from 1982 to 1986, infla-
tion occurred at an average annual rate of three and two-tenths percent.
Computations reflect geometric averages of annual changes in the Consumer
Price Index through 1978, and in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers thereafter, reflecting a change in Bureau of Labor Statistics meth-
odology. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS 350 (1985), updated by 110 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 83
(July 1987).
68. See infra notes 146-84 and accompanying text.
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gross income. 69 When a taxpayer generates income with the
assistance of plant or equipment, the purchase price of the asset
does not constitute a "cost" at the time the taxpayer acquires it,
because at that time the taxpayer simply exchanges one valua-
ble asset, the cash used to purchase the productive asset, for an-
other of equal value. This transaction in itself results in no
reduction of the taxpayer's net wealth. Instead, the taxpayer's
true cost of asset ownership consists of the decline in the asset's
value from year to year-the asset's "economic depreciation. '70
Depreciation allowances at the "economic" rate have be-
come a hallmark of tax neutrality in an accretion system.7 ' De-
preciation deductions at a faster-than-economic rate provide
deductions before the taxpayer actually incurs costs. This gives
the taxpayer the equivalent of an interest-free loan from the
government and effectively taxes income from the depreciable
asset at a rate lower than that imposed on income from other
sources. Similarly, depreciation allowances at a slower-than-
economic rate deprive the taxpayer of timely recovery of actual
economic costs and thus subject income from the depreciable
asset to an effective rate of taxation higher than that imposed
on income from other sources. Congress explicitly based the
tax code's current depreciation allowances, established in the
1986 Act, on estimates of economic depreciation.72
Traditionally, the tax laws have allowed depreciation de-
ductions according to schedules that permit a taxpayer to de-
69. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
70. See M. GRAETZ, supra note 25, at 391.
71. For the leading demonstration of the neutrality of economic deprecia-
tion, see Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure In-
variant Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604, 605-06 (1964).
72. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
Economists Jeremy Bulow and Lawrence Summers argue that, because an
asset's actual economic depreciation will vary from the estimates set forth in
the tax law's depreciation schedules, the effective rate of tax on income from
depreciable property will vary. Bulow and Summers argue that this uncer-
tainty as to effective tax rates can place holders of depreciable assets at a dis-
advantage with respect to taxpayers who earn income from other sources,
whose effective tax rates can be predicted with more confidence. To compen-
sate for this effect, Bulow and Summers argue that deductions exceeding true
economic depreciation are necessary to promote investment neutrality. Bulow
& Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 20, 21-22 (1984); cf.
Durst, The Depreciation Debate: Have Bulow and Summers Suggested a Viable
Compromise?, 30 TAX NOTES 259, 260-62 (1986) (interpreting and commenting
on Bulow and Summers' study in connection with legislative discussions lead-
ing to 1986 Act). But cf. Gordon & Wilson, Measuring the Efficiency Cost of
Taxing Risky Capital Income, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 427 (1989) (suggesting modi-
fications to Bulow-Summers methodology).
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duct a stated percentage of an asset's original purchase price
each year until the taxpayer has fully recovered the asset's
original cost. Over the course of an asset's life, however, the
value of the dollar may change, and a deduction based on the
asset's price in the year of purchase may no longer provide an
adequate measure of the owner's economic loss during a later
year.7 3 Because gross income from a depreciable asset; typi-
cally, the amount earned from selling goods or services pro-
duced with the help of the asset, will rise naturally with
inflation, but in the absence of specific legal authorization de-
preciation allowances will not, taxable income from the asset
will rise by more than the rate of inflation, resulting in an arti-
ficially high tax.74
Reference to the economic depreciation of an automobile,
as estimated by the Treasury Department in its 1984 proposal,
illustrates this effect.7 5 Assuming that the automobile has an
initial purchase price of $10,000, the economic depreciation of
the asset, as well as gross income and taxable income from the
asset, are as depicted in Table 1:
Table 1-Economic Depreciation and Income From
Automobile in Absence of Inflation
Gross Taxable
Year Income76  Depreciation 77  Income
1 $4,491 $3,491 $1,000
2 3,118 2,467 651
3 2,175 1,771 404
4 1,524 1,297 227
5 1,071 974 97
73. See 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 154-55.
74. Portions of the following discussion are based on H. Calkins & M.
Durst, Inflation and Capital Recovery-A Proposal for a Safety Valve 3-7 (Oct.
1985) (unpublished memorandum) (available in TAX NOTES Microfiche Data
Base, Doc. No. 85-9659; also available in LEXIS, Fedtax library, TNT file); see
infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
75. 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 160-61. The Treasury based
its proposed economic depreciation schedules on estimates set forth in Hulten
& Wykoff, The Measurement of Economic Depreciation, in DEPRECIATION, IN-
FLATION, AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 81 (C. Hulten ed.
1981).
76. Gross income from the asset is estimated on the assumption that the
asset generates enough income each year to compensate the owner for the
asset's decline in value during the year, and to provide the owner with a
before-tax rate of return of ten percent on the undepreciated value of the
asset as of the beginning of the taxable year. For example, the undepreciated
value of the asset as of the beginning of Year I is its original purchase price of
$10,000. Gross income during Year 1 is estimated at $4491-the amount
required to compensate the owner for the asset's depreciation of $3491 during
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Assuming that inflation causes gross income to increase by
five percent each year, but Congress does not adjust deprecia-
tion for inflation, taxable income will be computed bs follows:
Table 2-Taxable Income When Gross Income Rises
With Inflation But Depreciation Does Not
Gross Taxable
Year Income Depreciation Income
1 $4,716 $3,491 $1,225
2 3,438 2,467 971
3 2,518 1,771 747
4 1,852 1,297 555
5 1,367 974 393
Taxable income in Year 1 ($1225) is now twenty-two and one-
half percent higher than taxable income in the absence of infla-
tion ($1000), although prices generally have increased by only
five percent.
The disparity increases over the asset's life, as inflation
continues to run its course. In Year 5, taxable income after in-
flation ($393) is approximately 400% of taxable income before
inflation ($97), although prices generally have risen by only
about twenty-eight percent from Year 1 to Year 5. Focusing on
the high percentage changes in the later years of the asset's life
risks magnifying the overall effects of inflation, because both
gross income and taxable income are lowest in the later years,
when the effect of inflation is greatest. Nevertheless, the over-
all effect is very large. Inflation at a rate of only five percent,
in the example, has increased the present value of the inves-
tor's tax burden, computed as of the time the investor
purchased the asset, by more than forty percent over the life of
the asset.78 Even moderate inflation can have a "devastating
the year, plus a return of $1000, 10% of the asset's undepreciated value as of
the beginning of the year.
77. Under the Treasury proposal, automobiles would have been
depreciable over a period of five years, using a "declining balance" rate of 32%
per year-that is, each year the asset-owner could deduct 32% of the asset's
remaining undepreciated cost. 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 161.
The Treasury report noted that, under a pure declining-balance system, the
taxpayer never reduces the basis of an asset entirely to zero, and that
legislation implementing the Treasury proposal would need to modify the
schedules to force them to "zero out" in the desired "close-out" year. Id. at
158. For purposes of the table in the text, the author has modified the asset's
declining-balance depreciation schedule slightly to achieve the desired close-
out in the fifth year.
78. In the absence of inflation, and assuming a tax rate of 25% and a dis-
count rate of 7.5% per year, reflecting both the 25% tax rate and the investor's
before-tax rate of return from the asset of 10%, the discounted present value
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impact . . . on the present value of historical-cost
depreciation." 79
The effects of inflation on depreciation are not uniform
among different categories of assets, a fact which compounds
the economic distortion caused by inflation. Inflation will most
seriously magnify the tax burden on relatively long-lived depre-
ciable assets. The taxpayer purchasing a long-lived asset must
"live with" the asset's original, indexed basis for a relatively
long time. Shorter-lived assets are exhausted and repurchased
more frequently, each time giving the owner a new deprecia-
tion basis reflecting the new price level at the time of purchase.
The overall effect is that inflation not only creates a general
bias against investment in depreciable assets, but also distorts
the investor's choice among different categories of depreciable
assets.8 0
2. Methods of Adjusting Depreciation Allowances
for Inflation
Congress can remedy the distortions of inflation by al-
lowing the owner of a depreciable asset to increase depreciation
allowances each year to reflect changes in the value of the dol-
lar. Because the Code currently states depreciation allowances
as a percentage of the asset's remaining undepreciated basis,8 '
Congress can accomplish the adjustment by increasing the as-
set's remaining basis each year to reflect inflation.8 2 This ad-
justment will permit the asset owner to measure the deduction
allowed for the costs of asset ownership (that is, the decline in
the asset's value during the year) in the same currency unit
that is used to measure gross income.
of the investor's expected tax bill is $514.08. (The tax bill is computed by ref-
erence to the "taxable income" figures from Table 1). If inflation occurs at a
rate of 5% per year, however, as Table 2 illustrates, but no adjustments are
made to depreciation allowances, the discounted present value (employing a
discount rate of 12.5%-the previous rate of 7.5% increased to reflect the 5%
inflation) of the investor's expected tax bill from the asset is $736.33. Intro-
ducing inflation at a rate of 5% thus has increased the investor's effective tax
burden over the life of the asset by approximately 43%.
79. Gramlich, The Economic and Budgetary Effects of Indexing the Tax
System, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAx, supra note 15, at 284.
80. Cf. Jorgenson & Sullivan, Inflation and Corporate Capital Recovery,
in DEPRECIATION, INFLATION, AND THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL,
supra note 75, at 171-75 (commenting on substantial differences in effective
tax rates among depreciable assets under pre-1986 law).
81. I.R.C. § 168 (West 1989).
82. See 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 158.
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Table 3 indicates the effectiveness of this adjustment based
on the example of the five-year asset employed above, when de-
preciation allowances, as well as gross income, increase with
inflation:
Table 3-Taxable Income When Both Gross Income and
Depreciation Allowances Rise with Inflation
Gross Taxable
Year Income Depreciation Income
1 $4,716 $3,666 $1,050
2 3,438 2,720 718
3 2,518 2,050 468
4 1,852 1,577 275
5 1,367 1,243 124
Here, taxable income in Year 1 ($1050) is five percent
higher than it was in the absence of any inflation ($1000, as in-
dicated in Table 1, above)-an appropriate result in view of the
general price inflation of five percent. Similarly, taxable in-
come in Year 5 ($124) is twenty-seven and eight-tenths percent
higher than was taxable income in the absence of inflation
($97), a result that again is consistent with the assumption of
five percent inflation over a period of five years.8 3 The indexa-
tion of depreciation allowances therefore results in a tax on in-
come from depreciable property equivalent to that on income
earned on a current basis, for example, on income from labor.
The explicit indexation of an asset's basis is not the only
means by which Congress might adjust depreciation allowances
for inflation. As an alternative, Congress might simply provide
increased depreciation allowances, on an ex ante basis, to reflect
inflation anticipated over the life of an asset.84 As will be seen,
Congress historically has favored this method of adjustment.8 5
This approach should prove satisfactory if inflation conforms to
the assumptions incorporated in the predetermined schedules.
Inflation, however, like many other economic variables, cannot
be forecast with certainty, and depreciation schedules that in-
corporate estimates of future inflation will, over time, either
overcompensate or undercompensate for actual price changes.
If the schedules undercompensate, the tax system will provide
83. In other words, five percent inflation occurring over a five-year period
will increase prices generally by 27.8%.
84. See generally Feldstein, Adjusting Depreciation in an Inflationary
Economy: Indexing Versus Acceleration, 34 NAT'L TAX J. 29 (1981) (arguing
that accelerated depreciation schedules can adjust adequately for inflation ab-
sent drastic changes in inflation rate).
85. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
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inadequate capital recovery and will discourage capital invest-
ment. If the schedules overcompensate, the tax system will
provide an unintended investment subsidy. Moreover, as the
example immediately above shows, the resulting distortions
might be large.1s
A third and relatively novel method of adjusting deprecia-
tion for inflation, advocated by economists Alan Auerbach and
Dale Jorgenson, is to allow a single depreciation deduction in
the year in which a taxpayer purchases an asset, equal to the
discounted present value of depreciation expected over the as-
set's useful life.8 7 Because the asset purchaser would receive
deductions equal in present value to those that Congress would
allow under a policy of periodic deduction of economic depreci-
ation, such an approach would preserve investment neutrality.
Moreover, because the taxpayer would take the first-year de-
duction in full at the time the taxpayer purchases the asset, the
real value of the deduction would be immune from the effects
of inflation.
As was true with respect to capital gains, economic and
political factors other than a desire for a neutral measure of net
income may influence the choice of a depreciation policy. Most
importantly, policymakers often argue that to encourage capital
investment, Congress should shield income from depreciable as-
sets from the full effects of the income tax, as it historically has
shielded capital gains. This view has led, during the past three
decades, to policies of explicitly "accelerated" depreciation
schedules-schedules set deliberately to provide deductions at
rates faster than estimated economic depreciation.8 8
One form of accelerated depreciation that has attracted a
good deal of attention consists of the immediate deduction, or
"expensing," of the complete cost of an asset at the time the
taxpayer purchases the asset.8 9 Expensing conforms to a con-
86. For a quantitative review of likely distortions, see Feldstein, supra
note 84, at 36-39; Gann, Taxation of Capital Income Under Three Tax Reform
Plans, 26 TAx NOTES 187, 188-90 (1985); Jorgenson & Sullivan, supra note 80,
at 226.
To the extent that the use of ex ante inflation adjustments increases the
taxpayer's uncertainty as to the prospective effective tax rate on income from
an asset, it raises the concern identified by Bulow and Summers, supra note
72.
87. Auerbach & Jorgenson, The First Year Capital Recovery System, 10
TAX NoTEs 515 (1980), also published in slightly revised form as Inflation-
Proof Depreciation of Assets, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 113.
88. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
89. The Code currently permits a limited amount of expensing, up to
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sumption tax model of the tax base, under which a taxpayer is
allowed to deduct all amounts saved or invested during the
year.90 The outstanding feature of the consumption-tax model,
for current purposes, is that it produces a result which is eco-
nomically equivalent to the complete exemption from taxation
of income from all forms of investment, including investment
in depreciable assets.91
Expensing therefore not only insulates investment in de-
preciable assets from the disincentive effects of income taxa-
tion, but by providing an effective tax rate of zero on income
from all investments, it avoids distorting the choice among dif-
ferent depreciable assets. Moreover, because the taxpayer
takes the entire deduction under expensing in a single instant,
changes in the price level over time will not affect the deduc-
tion's real value.92
$10,000 per year, for purchases of equipment by small businesses. I.R.C. § 179
(West 1989).
90. See Andrews, supra note 9, passim; Bradford, The Case for a Personal
Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 77-
80 (J. Pechman ed. 1980). Under a consumption tax, amounts withdrawn from
savings or investment during the year and not reinvested are included in gross
income.
91. Using a format employed by Alvin Warren, this feature of expensing
can be demonstrated by reference to the example of a five-year asset with an
initial purchase price of $10,000 depicted in Table 1. See Warren, Accelerated
Capital Recovery, Deb4 and Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAw. 549, 552 (1985).
If taxpayers are permitted to expense assets, an investor facing a marginal
tax rate of 25% can, with an out-of-pocket investment of $10,000, make an in-
vestment of $13,333 in the depreciable asset-$10,000 of the investor's own
money, plus the tax savings of $3333 from the deduction of the $13,333 in-
vested (that is, 0.25 X $13,333 = $3,333). With a total investment of $13,333,
gross income from the asset each year will be 1.3333 times the gross income
from the $10,000 asset employed in Table 1. In view of the assumed tax rate of
25%, gross and after-tax income from the asset will be as follows:
Gross income After-tax income
(1-1/3 times amount (75% of gross
Year in Table 1) income)
1 $5,988 $4,491
2 4,157 3,118
3 2,900 2,175
4 2,032 1,524
5 1,428 1,071
The resulting pattern of after-tax income from the $10,000 out-of-pocket
investment under consumption-tax rules is identical to the pattern of before-
tax gross income, indicated in Table I in the text, from the $10,000 investment
under accretion-tax rules. Thus, the effect of consumption-tax treatment; that
is, expensing, is to provide complete exemption from taxation of income
earned by the taxpayer on the $10,000 out-of-pocket investment.
92. See Bradford, supra note 90, at 88.
The tax code could combine expensing with inflation-adjusted economic
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3. The Code's Historical and Current Approaches to
Depreciation Allowances
The tax laws never have sought explicitly to index depreci-
ation allowances for inflation. From the earliest days of the
federal income tax until 1981, however, the statutes and appli-
cable administrative guidelines permitted increasingly acceler-
ated depreciation schedules.9 3  For most of this period,
policymakers seem to have based the acceleration more on the
belief that accelerated schedules more accurately portray the
true economic depreciation of assets in a technologically chang-
ing environment, and a desire to provide investment incentives,
than on a desire to adjust for the effects of inflation.94 Addi-
tionally, in 1962, Congress augmented the accelerated deprecia-
tion schedules with an investment tax credit.95 This credit gave
a purchaser of depreciable business equipment a tax rebate, in
an amount ranging from seven to ten percent of the asset's cost,
in the year in which the taxpayer purchased the asset-a move
explicitly designed to provide an incentive, beyond economic
depreciation, or with its economic equivalent, the Jorgenson-Auerbach first-
year capital allowance, see supra text accompanying note 87, in order to pro-
vide an inflation-proof recovery system with any desired level of incentive for
capital investment. The tax laws might, for example, permit the taxpayer to
expense a given percentage of the asset's cost, and to claim economic deprecia-
tion, or the equivalent Jorgenson-Auerbach deduction, on the rest. See
Harberger, Tax Neutrality in Investment Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION 299 (1980). If applied consistently, this form of incentive deprecia-
tion should provide equal effective tax rates on income from all categories of
assets. There need be no conflict, therefore, between a desire to provide a
moderate level of incentive through accelerated, but not instantaneous, depre-
ciation and a desire to insulate depreciation allowances from the effects of
inflation.
93. For historical overviews of United States tax depreciation policy, see
Lischer, Depreciation Policy: Whither Thou Goest, 32 Sw. L.J. 545, 546-73
(1978); Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TAX L. REV. 483,
521-50 (1985).
94. For example, in significantly accelerating depreciation allowances in
1954, the congressional tax-writing committees argued that the new schedules
would result "in a timing of allowances more in accord with the actual pattern
of loss of economic usefulness," and referred to "[t]he incentives resulting
from the changes." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1954), re-
printed in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4017, 4048; S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
4621, 4656; see also Announcement 71-76, 1971-2 C.B. 503, 512-17 (announcing
acceleration of depreciation allowances by administrative action in 1971, a pe-
riod of both high inflation and economic slowdown, and emphasizing needs to
provide better reflection of economic depreciation and to place United States
industries in a more competitive posture).
95. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 960, 962-73.
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depreciation, for capital investment.96
The rapid acceleration of inflation in the mid-1970s, how-
ever, coupled with persistently slow economic growth, brought
the effects of inflation on depreciation closer to center stage.
Business groups argued that high inflation tended to erode the
value of the depreciation deductions over time and that, even
beyond mere inflation adjustment, faster-than-economic al-
lowances were needed to encourage an adequate level of capital
investment.97 Aided by the change in the political environment
symbolized by the landslide election of Ronald Reagan in 1980,
Congress enacted depreciation allowances of unprecedented ac-
celeration. Under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System
(ACRS) enacted in 1981, asset owners could "write off" the
value of most items of equipment over five years, a period far
shorter than the actual estimated useful lives of most categories
of equipment, and of buildings over fifteen years.98 The 1981
Act additionally raised the level of the investment tax credit
from seven to ten percent for many assets.99
As the political storm of 1981 subsided, academic and gov-
ernment studies showed that, under reasonable expectations of
inflation, the ACRS allowances, in combination with the invest-
ment tax credit, would offer investors negative effective tax
rates on income from many assets.1 00 Thus, the allowances
could provide investors with positive after-tax returns from in-
96. The Senate Finance Committee report on the institution of the invest-
ment tax credit said, "Realistic depreciation alone... is not enough to provide
... essential economic growth. In addition, a specific incentive must be pro-
vided if a high rate of growth is to be achieved." S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1962 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3304, 3314.
On various occasions Congress adjusted the rate of the investment tax
credit-and repealed it temporarily-in response to changing economic condi-
tions after 1962, finally repealing the credit in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 211-213, 100 Stat. 2085, 2166-73. See generally Steines,
supra note 93, at 524-27, 537, 540-41 (discussing changes to credit).
97. See generally Steines, supra note 93, at 528-34 (discussing debate lead-
ing to Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981).
98. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 211, 95 Stat.
172, 227-35; see generally Steines, supra note 93, at 534-38 (discussing replace-
ment of prior rules with ACRS).
99. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, § 211(a), 95 Stat. at 227.
100. For an early discussion of the negative tax rates that were projected
under ACRS, see Gravelle, Depreciation Policy Options, 5 STUD. IN TAx'N,
PUB. FIN. & RELATED SUBJECTS 126, 131 (1981). The 1982 Annual Report of
the President's Council of Economic Advisers highlighted the negative tax
rates under ACRS. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 122-27 (1982); see
CEA Sees Negative Tax Rates on Some New Investment, 14 TAx NOTES 426,
426-28 (1982).
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vestments that, on a before-tax basis, actually were unprofita-
ble. Moreover, the ACRS allowances would generate widely
varying effective tax rates on income from different depreciable
assets.
In response to these concerns, Congress lengthened depre-
ciation schedules slightly and adjusted the investment tax
credit in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA).' ° ' Congress intended, under TEFRA, for the dis-
counted present value of capital allowances on equipment, at
projected rates of inflation, to approximate the immediate de-
duction, or expensing, of the asset's purchase price.10 2 If suc-
cessful, this policy would have avoided negative effective tax
rates, yielding instead effective tax rates of zero, and would in
the process have eliminated the problem of varying effective
tax rates across asset classes.
10 3
Inflation, however, fell sharply below the levels Congress
had assumed when it established revised ACRS schedules in
1982.104 The attempt to simulate immediate expensing there-
fore failed. Strongly negative effective tax rates persisted on
income from many categories of assets, and effective tax rates
continued to vary widely across asset classes.10 5 This phenome-
non-which arose directly from Congress's decisions in 1981
and 1982 to compensate for inflation by ex ante adjustments-
helped fuel calls for "comprehensive" tax reform which gained
special prominence in the presidential campaign of 1984, and
resulted in the Treasury I study in November of that year.
0 6
Treasury I proposed the allowance of economic deprecia-
tion, based on statistical estimates of the rates at which assets
of various kinds have tended to decline in value over time.
0 7
The Treasury plan established an office to revise these esti-
mates periodically in response to changes in the technological
101. Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 205-206, 96 Stat. 324, 427-31 (1982).
102. Id. §§ 205-206, 96 Stat. at 427-31. For an expression of the intent to
simulate expensing of personal property, see S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 122-23, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 781, 888; see
generally Steines, supra note 93, at 538-43 (discussing TEFRA).
103. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 67.
105. See 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 156.
106. The Treasury I report pointed out, for example, that "[s]ince current
[1984] rates of inflation are significantly lower than those prevailing when the
ITC and ACRS were enacted, current law allows investment in depreciable as-
sets to be recovered far more rapidly than under a neutral system of income
taxation." I i& at 105.
107. 2 id. at 152-76.
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and economic environment.10 8 Most importantly for present
purposes, Treasury I substituted explicit indexation of deprecia-
tion allowances for the previous attempt to compensate for in-
flation by ex ante acceleration.10 9 Treasury I also eliminated
the investment tax credit.110
The Administration's revised reform plan, Treasury II, re-
tained Treasury I's approach of basing depreciation schedules
on statistically derived estimates of true economic depreciation,
but superimposed an acceleration on the estimated economic al-
lowances as an explicit incentive for capital investment. 1 1 The
Administration designed the Treasury II schedules to provide
roughly equal effective tax rates across asset classes. Like
Treasury I, Treasury II indexed asset basis for inflation.112
The House version of the 1986 Act returned to an apparent
policy of ex ante adjustments for inflation through the accelera-
tion of depreciation schedules. The House bill offered al-
lowances that were roughly equivalent to the "economic"
deductions of Treasury I, apparently based on an assumed infla-
tion rate of four percent.1 3 As an important innovation, how-
108. 2 id. at 160-62. This proposal was retained in subsequent legislative
proposals, and in the 1986 Act itself, but was eliminatec from the Code in 1988.
From 1986 until late 1988, § 168(i)(1) of the Code gave the Treasury authority
to alter depreciation lives for particular classes of assets, based on studies of
assets' actual declines in value. In the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Congress repealed this authority, while continuing to instruct the
Treasury to "monitor and analyze actual experience with respect to all depre-
ciable assets." Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6253, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs (102 Stat.) 3342, 3753 (amending I.R.C. § 168(i)(1)).
109. 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 158.
110. Id at 173-75. This proposal was retained in subsequent reform plans
and in the final version of the 1986 Act. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat.
2085, 2166-70.
111. TREASURY II, supra note 52, at 132-63.
112. Id at 164-73.
113. For a comparison of the depreciation allowances of the Treasury I and
House plans, see Durst, supra note 72, at 262 (using methodology employed in
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., IST SESs., TAx REFORM
PROPOSALS: TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME 85-90 (Comm. Print 1985)). The
Ways and Means Committee described its proposed depreciation schedules as
providing a moderate level of investment incentive, see H.R. REP. No. 426,
supra note 57, at 146, although the analysis in Durst, supra, suggests that if
anticipated inflation is taken into account, the House allowances conformed
closely to estimated true economic depreciation.
The House committee report explicitly rejected the notion of employing
highly accelerated depreciation as an economic incentive: "Proponents of mas-
sive tax benefits for depreciable property have theorized that these benefits
would stimulate investment in such property, which in turn would pull the en-
tire economy into more rapid growth. The committee perceives that nothing
of this kind has happened." H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 57, at 145-46.
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ever, the House bill contained a "safety valve" provision, which
allowed investors limited adjustments to depreciation deduc-
tions if inflation significantly exceeded anticipated levels in the
future.114 The House bill permitted taxpayers to increase de-
preciation allowances by one-half of the extent to which infla-
tion exceeded five percent in any given year. Thus, although
the House bill did not provide full indexation of depreciation
allowances, it partially mitigated the distortions that would
arise if inflation were substantially to exceed the levels incor-
porated in the ex ante depreciation schedules.
In an avowed attempt to provide stronger incentives for
capital formation, the Senate version of the 1986 Act provided
allowances substantially more accelerated than those of the
House bill. 115 The Senate bill dropped the House proposal for
"safety valve" inflation adjustments and instead relied entirely
on ex ante acceleration to compensate for the anticipated ef-
fects of inflation.
Ultimately, the 1986 Act incorporated depreciation al-
lowances that apparently are designed to afford "economic," as
opposed to accelerated, depreciation. Congress did not adopt
any explicit indexation mechanism; rather it incorporated into
the depreciation schedules an apparent ex ante adjustment for
inflation at an assumed annual rate of slightly more than three
percent, approximately the rate prevailing when Congress con-
sidered the legislation leading to the 1986 Act.116 The 1986 Act
114. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 57, at 154-55. The House apparently
based the "safety valve" approach on a proposal by Hugh Calkins, then head of
the American Bar Association Tax Section, but acting in his personal capacity,
who, with the assistance of the author of this Article, offered the proposal to
the Ways and Means Committee and other policymakers in the fall of 1985.
See H. Calkins and M. Durst, supra note 74. The Calkins proposal was similar
in structure to that adopted by the House, although the Calkins proposal
would have allowed somewhat more generous inflation adjustments, permit-
ting the taxpayer to adjust allowances by 80%, as opposed to 50%, of the ex-
tent to which inflation exceeded the specified "trigger" rate. Id. at 11-12; cf.
infra note 181 (describing recently introduced bill to provide "savety valve" in-
dexation of capital gains).
115. See S. REP. No. 313, supra note 60, at 97-106. The Senate Finance
Committee said in its report:
The committee believes some ... acceleration in the rate of recovery
of depreciation deductions should be provided to compensate partly
for the repeal of the investment tax credit. The committee is cogni-
zant that other nations heavily subsidize business investments
through tax and other policies, and the committee does not believe
such policies can be completely ignored.
Id. at 96.
116. Economist Alan Auerbach has estimated that assuming an inflation
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thus leaves open the possibility that substantially accelerated
inflation will diminish the real value of depreciation al-
lowances, raising both economic and political pressures for revi-
sion of the current system.
C. THE EFFECTS OF INFLATION ON THE TAX CONSEQUENCES
OF INTEREST PAYMENTS
1. The Basic Effects of Inflation on the Tax Burdens of
Lenders and Borrowers1 1
7
Consider first the very simple situation of a person,
whether or not an asset holder, who borrows $100 for a period
of one year. In the absence of anticipated inflation, the lender
will charge the borrower annual interest equivalent to the
lender's "time value of money"-the price the lender will de-
mand for forgoing alternative uses of the borrowed funds dur-
ing the year.118 For example, in the absence of anticipated
inflation, the annual interest rate charged to a reasonably
creditworthy borrower might amount to five percent.
Adding inflation to the equation complicates the picture.
The lender will demand, in addition to compensation for the
time value of money, compensation for the erosion that infla-
tion will cause in the value of the borrower's repayment obliga-
tion during the course of the year. If inflation occurs during
the year at an annual rate of ten percent, the real value of the
borrower's repayment obligation would shrink at the rate of
ten percent during the year,119 a result that would enrich the
borrower at the expense of the lender. To compensate for this
enrichment and to make the lender "whole," the parties must
find some way of effectively increasing the amount of the re-
payment obligation during the year.120
rate of three percent, the 1986 allowances would result in effective tax rates
on income from most categories of depreciable assets that are slightly higher
than the statutory rate. See Auerbach, The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the
Cost of Capital, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74-77 (1987). This result implies that the
1986 allowances generally approximate economic depreciation at inflation
rates slightly lower than three percent.
117. The discussion in this subsection follows, in substance, the analysis in
1 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 77, and 2 id. at 193-200.
118. For a general discussion of factors affecting the determination of in-
terest rates, see R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
543-73 (3d ed. 1988).
119. Assuming an initial repayment obligation of $100, the real value at the
end of the year, computed in "old," uninflated dollars, would be $100 / 1.10, or
$90.90.
120. In the example, the amount of the repayment obligation must increase
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To accomplish this adjustment in practice, lenders com-
monly require that interest payments include compensation for
the time value of money (as well as for any risk of default), and
an additional amount designed to compensate for the erosion of
the value of the loan principal anticipated from inflation. Thus,
in the above example, if the parties expected inflation to occur
at a rate of ten percent per year, the borrower would be respon-
sible for interest not of five but of fifteen percent: five percent
to compensate the lender for the time value of money, plus ten
percent to compensate the lender for the erosion in the value of
the borrower's repayment obligation. Interest thus commonly
includes two components: a "real" component designed to com-
pensate the lender for the time value of money and for bearing
any risk of nonpayment, and an "inflation" component
designed to offset the effects of inflation on the value of the
principal.
To measure net income properly under an accretion-model
tax system, Congress should permit a borrower who uses loan
proceeds for income-producing purposes to deduct the true eco-
nomic cost of maintaining the loan. In periods of inflation, the
borrower's economic cost of maintaining the loan is the differ-
ence between the borrower's total interest expense (including
both the time value of money and inflation components of in-
terest, as well as any risk premium charged by the lender) and
the economic benefit the borrower receives from the erosion of
the real value of the repayment obligation. Thus, under a pure
accretion system, if Congress permitted the borrower of a loan
for income-producing purposes to deduct in full all interest paid
on the loan, Congress also should require the borrower to in-
clude in gross income the amount by which inflation lowers the
real value of the borrower's repayment obligation.
The proper tax treatment of the lender, under an accre-
tion-model system, mirrors that of the borrower. Congress
should require the lender to include in gross income all interest
payments received from the borrower. In addition, as the bor-
rower receives an economic benefit from inflation's erosion of
the real value of the repayment obligation, the lender suffers
an economic detriment. Congress should permit the lender to
deduct the amount of this detriment.
In actual operation, the tax laws depart radically from the
from $100 to $110 dollars, the year-end equivalent, in terms of purchasing
power, of the $100 in "old" dollars that the borrower received at the inception
of the loan.
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accretion model in their treatment of debt. Although the tax
code does not include in gross income the economic benefit the
borrower enjoys from the erosion in the value of the repayment
obligation, the Code generally does allow the taxpayer to de-
duct the entire amount of interest payments made, including
the inflation premium. As a result, the borrower can deduct in-
flation-related costs without paying an offsetting tax on infla-
tion-related benefits. Conversely, the lender must include all
interest payments in gross income, but does not receive any de-
duction for inflation's erosion of the value of the repayment
obligation.
These imperfections in the tax treatment of debt would
have no significant consequences if the borrower and lender
shared the same marginal tax rate.12' The Code's undertaxing
of the borrower as a result of inflation then would match pre-
cisely the overtaxing of the lender. In a competitive market for
loans, lenders would pass their tax costs to borrowers in the
form of additional interest, so that the cost of borrowing would
be the same as it would be under a tax system that adjusted
both interest deductions and receipts for inflation. The bor-
rower and lender would be left in the same economic positions
they would occupy if the Code conformed to the accretion
model.
Borrowers and lenders, however, often do not face the
same marginal tax rates. In many loan transactions, the lender
faces an unusually low marginal rate or is entirely tax-ex-
empt.122 Thus, in many instances, the borrower's tax advantage
121. See Hickman, Interes Depreciation, and Indexing, 5 VA. TAX REV.
773, 802 (1986). A taxpayer's "marginal tax rate" is the rate the taxpayer
would pay on an additional dollar of income received. See D. MOFFAT, supra
note 14, at 189.
122. One analyst has estimated that almost one-half of all interest pay-
ments are received by tax-exempt entities such as pension funds, or otherwise
are received in tax-exempt form. See C. STEUERLE, TAXES, LOANS, AND INFLA-
TION 48-49 (1985). The marginal tax rates of other interest recipients are diffi-
cult to determine. Historically, the Code has taxed banks and other financial
institutions at relatively low rates, owing largely to generous rules for deduct-
ing anticipated loan losses, but the 1986 Act reduced this and other advantages.
See generally O'Brien & Gelfand, Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on
Commercial Banks, 34 TAX NOTES 597 (1987) (estimating effect of major
changes in 1986 Act on bank profitability); O'Brien & Gelfand, Corrigendum:
The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Commercial Banks, 34 TAX
NOTES 1323 (1987) (concluding that 1986 Act might have moderately adverse
effect on banks). The tax advantages accruing when a borrower is in a high
bracket and a lender is in a low bracket almost certainly have caused dispro-
portionate representation by low-bracket entities among the economy's lend-
ers. The Treasury has noted:
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from deducting the inflation component of interest will not
match the corresponding tax detriment to the lender and infla-
tion will result in an overall tax reduction.
23
In keeping with Treasury I's policy of adhering closely to
the accretion model, the proposal would have implemented for
the first time a system of explicit indexation for debt. 24 On
grounds of feasibility, Treasury I rejected the theoretically ex-
act approach of computing the outstanding balance of each loan
on an annual basis, and of including in the borrower's gross in-
come, and excluding from the lender's gross income, the
amount by which inflation had caused the real value of the loan
principal to decline during the year.125 Treasury I instead em-
ployed the admittedly rough assumption that the "real" compo-
nent of interest on long-term debt averages approximately six
percent per year, and that interest paid in excess of six percent
constitutes an inflation premium. 126 Treasury I would have
used this assumption to estimate the proportion of interest pay-
ments and receipts during the year that was attributable to
inflation.
[I]n a progressive tax system, overstatement of interest expense and
income accentuates the existing incentive for lower tax-bracket tax-
payers (including tax-exempt institutions) to be net creditors and
higher tax-bracket taxpayers to be net borrowers. This so-called "cli-
entele effect" occurs because the tax savings from interest deductions
is greater for high-bracket borrowers than is the increased tax liabil-
ity from interest income to low-bracket lenders. This clientele effect
is aggravated during times of high inflation and corresponding high
nominal interest rates.
2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 194.
123. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
124. See 1 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 77; 2 id. at 193-200.
125. Treasury I did not follow the conceptually correct approach of ex-
cluding from income or disallowing deduction of an amount of inter-
est equal to the product of the inflation rate and the outstanding
principal of debt. This procedure was viewed as inordinately cumber-
some from an administrative standpoint, since in principle it would in-
volve applying an inflation adjustment factor to the principal
(calculated on the annualized basis) of every credit arrangement in
the economy; compliance would have been difficult except on loans
involving financial institutions or other .sophisticated borrowers or
lenders. In practice it would likely have resulted in "indexed" and
"unindexed" classes of loans which would have been somewhat arbi-
trary, difficult to monitor, and subject to abuse.
McLure & Zodrow, Treasury I and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Econom-
ics and Politics of Tax Reform, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 51-52 (1987).
126. 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 194-98. "The formula's use of
6 percent-a rate that is high relative to historical real interest rates-was
chosen to err on the side of a smaller than appropriate disallowance of interest
deductions (although this decision also implied a relatively small interest in-
come exclusion)." McLure & Zodrow, supra note 125, at 52.
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For example, if the average long-term interest rate in the
economy during the year was thirteen percent, Treasury I
would have assumed that six percent represented real interest,
and seven percent represented an inflation component. Based
on this assumption, Treasury I would have permitted borrowers
to deduct only six-thirteenths of any interest payments made
during the year, and would have excluded from gross income
an equivalent proportion of lenders' interest receipts.127
The Administration dropped Treasury I's debt-indexation
proposal from the Treasury II reform plan, thus rendering in-
terest indexation an early casualty of the legislative process
that led to the 1986 Act. In large measure, the failure of the
interest indexation proposal resulted from its sheer novelty to
many participants in the tax reform process, as well as from op-
position from the real estate industry, which relies heavily on
debt financing. 28 In addition, as the authors of Treasury I have
acknowledged, the restricted time period within which they
drafted Treasury I prevented them from addressing some im-
portant technical features of the plan. 2 9
A concern over prospective revenue losses also contributed
to the rejection of interest indexation in the 1986 Act. 30 A sig-
127. See 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 194-97.
128. "The proposal for interest indexing was strongly opposed by those in
the real estate and tax shelter industries." McLure & Zodrow, supra note 125,
at 52.
129. Most notably, Treasury I's rough method of interest indexation
reached inappropriate results for those taxpayers, such as banks, engaged in
the business of borrowing and relending money:
Suppose, for example, that a bank borrows at 8% and lends at
10% at a time when the inflation rate is 4%. Under an ideal system of
indexing, taxable interest income and allowable interest deduction
would, in effect, both be reduced by four percentage points, leaving
unchanged the two percentage points spread between borrowing and
lending rates. The Treasury I proposal, however, in effect applied a
fractional exclusion to net interest income or expenses. Thus, it
would reduce the spread representing the taxable income of the bank
by 40%. This illustration... shows that the proposed technique of in-
terest indexing would be defective for most net borrowers or lenders
who are active as both creditors and debtors.
McLure, supra note 30, at 1630 n.28. Treasury I also implemented the interest
indexation proposal under a transitional rule that the plan's principal author,
in retrospect, acknowledged would pose hardships, especially for public utili-
ties that recently had floated large issues of debt. Id at 1655; see also Sunley,
The Tax Challenge for the 1990s, 40 TAx NOTES 621, 624 (1988) (stating short-
cut method was defective and stating need for further work on how interest
paid and received should be adjusted for inflation).
130. See McLure, supra note 30, at 1655; McLure & Z.odrow, supra note
125, at 52.
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nificant portion of interest paid consists of interest on federal
government debt. The payer of this interest-the govern-
ment-is tax-exempt, but the recipients comprise a mixture of
taxable and tax-exempt entities. The indexation plan's reduc-
tion of interest deductions therefore would not have raised tax
revenue from this interest, but the exclusion from gross income
of a portion of receipts would have reduced tax revenue. As
the principal author of Treasury I subsequently has pointed
out, the net effect on government revenues probably would
have been limited, because the partial exclusion from gross in-
come of receipts probably would have permitted the govern-
ment to lower the rate of interest paid on its debt.131 Despite
this argument, however, revenue concerns apparently helped to
account for the rejection of Treasury I's interest indexation
proposals.1
32
2. Net Tax Effects of Inflation on Holders of Debt-Financed
Depreciable and Capital Assets
Many holders of depreciable assets and of assets held for
capital gain finance the acquisition and holding of the assets
through loans. As the discussion above suggests, these asset-
holders experience two competing effects from inflation. First,
inflation increases their effective tax burdens, either by magni-
fying the extent of apparent capital gain or by reducing the real
value of depreciation allowances. At the same time, inflation
decreases their effective tax burdens by increasing the value of
the inflation component of interest, for which the Code allows
deductions.
Historically, the offsetting nature of these competing ef-
fects has constituted a significant argument against providing
any inflation adjustments at all. 3 3 This argument, however, ig-
nores the detrimental tax effects of inflation on holders of eq-
131. See McLure, supra note 30, at 1655; McLure & Zodrow, supra note
125, at 52 n.18.
132. Other factors contributing to the projected revenue losses of the
Treasury I interest indexation proposals included the plan's exemption of
home mortgage interest payments, its de minimis rules, and its unintentionally
generous treatment of financial institutions, supra note 126. See Halperin &
Steuerle, supra note 42, at 372 n.34.
133. The recognition that inflation causes offsetting effects on the tax bur-
den of holders of debt-financed assets has led to the belief "that you have to
index the entire balance sheet if you do it at all." Bristol, supra note 34, at
1028 (describing discussion at National Tax Association-Tax Institute of
America conference on current tax policy issues); cf. STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 25, at 28-29 (discussing partial indexation).
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uity-financed assets. Moreover, the argument almost certainly
overstates the inflation-related tax benefits accruing to holders
of debt-financed assets. To recognize this, it is useful first to
consider the competing effects of inflation on the tax burdens
of holders of debt-financed depreciable assets, and then to con-
sider the somewhat more complex situation of holders of debt-
financed assets held for capital gain.
If the economic depreciation of a debt-financed asset occurs
at the same rate as that at which the taxpayer amortizes the
loan used to carry the property,134 the overstatement of taxable
income from the decline in the value of depreciation al-
lowances, and the understatement of taxable income from the
allowance of a deduction for the inflation component of inter-
est, will precisely balance in economic effect over the term of
the loan.13 5 The aim of indexing depreciation allowances is to
ensure that at the time the taxpayer takes each deduction, the
amount of the deduction will be increased to account for the cu-
mulative effects of inflation since the taxpayer purchased the
asset. The aim of the lender in adding an "inflation premium"
to interest is to reach an economic result similar to that which
would result if, at the time the borrower repaid each increment
of principal, that increment increased to account for the accu-
mulated effects of inflation since the borrower purchased the
asset. If the loan schedule calls for the borrower to repay the
principal at the rate at which the asset depreciates, the total
economic value of the inflation adjustments to depreciation and
of the inflation component of interest should be identical over
the term of the loan.
Of course, this balance between inflation's overmeasure-
ment and undermeasurement of taxable income will exist only
for assets that the taxpayer finances entirely by debt. To the
extent that the taxpayer has financed the asset in part from eq-
uity, inflation will impose a tax cost by reducing the real value
of depreciation allowances without producing a countervailing
134. This congruence is likely, if it is assumed that the lender desires to ex-
tend financing as fully as possible without permitting the loan balance to ex-
ceed the remaining market value of the collateral, and that the borrower
wishes to retain financing to the largest extent that the lender will permit.
Under these assumptions, the lender will require repayments of principal at
the rate at which the value of the capital erodes-that is, at the rate of the
collateral's true economic depreciation.
135. Aaron, Inflation and the Income Tax: An Introduction, in INFLATION
AND THE INCOME TAx 1, 14 (H. Aaron ed. 1976); Gann, Neutral Taxation of
Capital Income: An Achievable Goal?, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 130-31.
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positive effect. Thus, for a very considerable class of deprecia-
ble assets,1 36 inflation poses an unmitigated tax detriment.
Even for assets that are entirely debt-financed, although
inflation's undermeasurement and overmeasurement of taxable
income should approximately balance, inflation's effects on the
asset holder's overall tax burden probably will not balance.
The taxpayer's ability to deduct the inflation component of in-
terest is likely to provide a pure tax benefit only if the recipient
of the interest faces no tax burden on its receipt. Otherwise,
market mechanisms almost surely will shift some of the tax
burden back to the borrower in the form of higher interest pay-
ments. Although many lenders are formally or effectively tax-
exempt, many others are not, so that at least some of the appar-
ent benefits borrowers enjoy as a result of inflation probably
are illusory.
The mechanisms by which lenders can shift some of the
tax burden of inflation back to borrowers are complex, and the
magnitude of the shift almost certainly varies in different situa-
tions.137 The shift can occur in a straightforward fashion, as
when lenders increase rates on adjustable-rate loans in periods
of high inflation. In the case of a fixed-rate loan, the lender
can shift the tax burden of inflation indirectly by increasing the
rate demanded at the inception of the loan, to compensate for
the risk that high inflation might impose an extra tax burden
on the lender while the loan is outstanding.
The fact that the loan market consists of a mixture of taxa-
ble and tax-exempt lenders enormously complicates the mar-
ket's response to accelerating inflation. The tax-exempt lender
experiences no additional tax burden as a result of inflation,
and thus has no immediate reason to shift any increased tax
burden onto the borrower. The fully taxable lender will seek
to pass along all of the increased tax burden. A likely result
will be a partial shifting. Competitive pressure from tax-ex-
empt lenders probably will constrain taxable lenders to some
136. Debt provides approximately 60% of total corporate financing in the
United States. See NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE TAXATION
OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 237 (1984) [hereinafter NATIONAL BUREAU OF Eco-
NOMIC RESEARCH].
137. See Fiscal Affairs Dep't, Int'l Monetary Fund, Interest Rates and Tax
Treatment of Interest Income and Expense, in TAXATION, INFLATION, AND IN-
TEREST RATES 15-39 (V. Tanzi ed. 1984); Bossons, Indexing for Inflation and
the Interest Deduction, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 945, 954-59 (1984); cf. Johnson, Tax
Shelter Gain: The Mismatch of Debt and Supply Side Depreciation, 61 TEX. L.
REV. 1013, 1041-47 (1983) (stressing significance and complexity of lenders' re-
sponse to receipt of taxable interest payments).
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extent in their attempts to shift their tax burdens, while tax-
exempt lenders probably will raise their rates somewhat to
match the increases of taxable lenders.1 38 Moreover, on the as-
sumption that the market for loans is less than perfectly com-
petitive, the extent of the shift is likely to vary from loan to
loan.
The almost certain result is that most holders of debt-fi-
nanced assets will not enjoy the full tax benefits potentially
arising from inflation. Thus, these benefits will not fully com-
pensate for the negative effects of inflation on the real value of
depreciation allowances. Even holders of debt-financed assets
therefore should receive some measure of indexation of depre-
ciation allowances. Nevertheless, because lenders are unlikely
to pass their full inflation-related tax burden back to borrow-
ers, inflation should affect owners of debt-financed depreciable
assets less than holders of equity-financed assets, and Congress
should entitle the former only to partial indexation.
The situation with respect to debt-financed assets held for
capital gain is similar, but not identical. When an asset is fully
debt-financed, the principal amount of the loan financing the
asset will at all times equal the value of the asset.1 39 Thus, if
the Code taxed capital gains on an accrual system, the asset
holder's detriment from inflation, resulting from the tax bur-
den on inflation's illusory "increase" in the asset's value, would
precisely equal the benefit from inflation arising from the de-
cline in the real value of the asset-holder's repayment obliga-
tion. The result would be an exact tax "wash" to the asset
holder.
Because the Code taxes capital gains on a realization basis,
however, it defers the tax detriment from inflation's magnifica-
tion of capital gains until the taxpayer disposes of the asset.1 40
The tax benefit from deduction of the inflation component of
interest accrues to the taxpayer immediately, because the Code
permits the taxpayer to deduct interest payments on a current
138. Essentially, the ultimate effect of inflation on interest rates depends
on the extent to which exempt lenders increase their lending in response to
market demand, perhaps by shifting their portfolios from equity to debt. If ex-
empt lenders can enter the market at will, taxable lenders will be constrained
entirely from shifting their increased tax burdens to borrowers. This extreme
result, however, is unlikely. See generally Bossons, supra note 137, at 954-57.
139. See supra note 134. When unrealized capital gains are present, full
debt-financing requires that the principal amount of the loan increase as the
asset appreciates-a pattern from which parties typically will depart in
practice.
140. See V. TANzI, INFLATION AND THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX 45-46 (1980).
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basis throughout the term of the loan.141 Overall, it is possible
that because the taxpayer will enjoy the benefits of inflation
currently and will suffer the detriment only on realization,
142
inflation might pose a net benefit to the holder of the debt-fi-
nanced asset.
Except when a taxpayer holds assets until the taxpayer's
death,143 it is unlikely that inflation will pose a significant net
benefit in practice. For the reasons described in the discussion
above of debt-financed depreciable assets, 14 4 higher interest
charged by the lender is likely to offset some of the benefit to
the taxpayer from deduction of the inflation component. Thus,
while the net tax result to the holder of a debt-financed capital
asset in times of inflation should be better than that to the
holder of the debt-financed depreciable asset, it will probably
not be so attractive as to constitute an overall tax benefit.14 5 At
least as a theoretical matter, Congress should allow holders of
debt-financed capital assets some level of capital-gains indexa-
tion, although the extent of the indexation should be less than
that afforded holders of equity-financed assets.
II. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONGRESS'S
FAILURE TO ADJUST THE TAX BASE FOR
INFLATION 146
The 1986 Act, like all tax legislation, represents a compro-
141. Section 163(d) of the Code may limit the taxpayer's ability to enjoy
the tax benefits of inflation through immediate interest deductions. Section
163(d) generally limits a taxpayer's deductions of "investment interest" to the
taxpayer's "investment income" for the year. I.R.C. § 163(d)(1) (West 1989).
Taxpayers generally must carry unused interest deductions forward until they
have investment income against which to deduct the interest. Id. § 163(d)(2).
Thus, a taxpayer who has incurred a loan in order to finance the holding of a
capital asset may not be able to deduct interest until the taxpayer sells the as-
set, generating investment income. If the taxpayer has investment income
from other, equity-financed assets, however, § 163(d) may not prevent the cur-
rent deduction of all of the taxpayer's loan interest.
142. By holding the asset until death, the asset holder would escape the tax
detriment from inflation completely. See supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
143. See id.
144. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (indicating that tax benefits
from deferral generally are small compared to tax detriments arising from in-
flation, except over relatively long holding periods or if taxpayer holds asset
until death).
146. This subsection considers whether an unanticipated acceleration of
inflation is likely to bring about a substantial revision of the 1986
accommodation, and outlines legislative approaches designed to promote tax
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mise among competing political and economic interests. Cen-
tral to the 1986 Act was the acceptance by taxpayers earning
income from capital of a significant cutback in depreciation al-
lowances, and repeal of the capital gains preference, in return
for the benefit of lower marginal rates. Presumably, the par-
ties to this political accommodation had in mind some probable
range of anticipated inflation rates at which the 1986 Act's com-
promise seemed acceptable. Should inflation significantly ex-
ceed anticipated levels, however, effective rates of taxation on
income from capital would increase markedly and the political
accord underlying the 1986 Act could unravel.147
The very large extent by which the 1986 Act's provisions
cut back on previous levels of capital incentives underscores the
new system's vulnerability to inflation. Although pre-1986 de-
preciation allowances, along with the investment tax credit,
permitted the effective "expensing" of assets in many circum-
stances, 48 inflation at rates significantly above four percent
generally will result in allowances under the 1986 Act that fail
to recover even economic depreciation. Similarly, the 1986 Act
cut back from a sixty-percent capital gains preference to no
preference at all. Even comparatively low rates of inflation
cause some overmeasurement of capital gain, and the magnifi-
cation may become dramatic if inflation accelerates
stability in an environment of uncertainty about future price changes. The
discussion is motivated by the related beliefs that a marked acceleration of
inflation would cause serious economic disruption that should be remedied,
and that incentives for capital formation beyond those required by inflation
adjustment would raise a significant possibility of undesirable revenue losses.
The main purpose of the discussion, however, is not to advocate these views,
but to explore the political feasibility of inserting some measure of inflation
protection into the Code, in advance of any resurgence of inflation, to protect
both the economy and the administrability of the tax code from the
disruptions that could ensue if Congress did not provide inflation adjustment
mechanisms. In view of the somewhat different political environments
surrounding depreciation allowances and the capital gain provisions, the
discussion treats these two portions of the Code separately.
147. Inflation could, conversely, prove to be lower than the levels antici-
pated by participants in the debates of 1986, causing effective tax rates on capi-
tal income actually to be lower than envisioned. This phenomenon occurred
following the adoption of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
when apparently excessive capital subsidies provided some of the impetus to
the changes in 1986. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. Congress
passed the 1986 Act, however, at a time of relatively low inflation, at least
within the comparative framework of the past twenty years. See supra note
106. At this writing, it seems more likely that in the relatively near term, in-
flation will exceed, rather than fall short of, the rates apparently assumed in
drafting the 1986 changes.
148. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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significantly. 49
A. THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK FOR DEPRECIATION POLICY
By significantly increasing the tax burden on holders of eq-
uity-financed depreciable property, a resurgence of inflation
would make the argument for tax revision both economically
and politically compelling. The argument would be compelling
economically as a consequence of the importance attached in
recent years to the need to revitalize the manufacturing sector
of the economy, a sector that relies disproportionately on equity
finance.150 This economic concern would gain added political
force owing to the relative ability of owners of equity-financed
depreciable assets-a group that consists largely of the coun-
try's publicly held manufacturing corporations-to present
their economic arguments in a politically effective manner.
Successful political pressure to augment depreciation al-
lowances if inflation should accelerate need not lead inevitably
to a large-scale disruption of the tax laws. Congress could re-
spond to more rapid inflation by means of a "surgical" accelera-
tion of depreciation allowances, leaving other elements of the
tax structure relatively unaffected. This would recall previous
congressional action on the investment tax credit, which Con-
gress increased and decreased several times between 1962 and
1986 in response to changing perceptions of the macroeconomic
need for a stimulus to investment. 51
Several factors, however, could render it difficult for Con-
gress to remedy the problem of resurgent inflation through
"surgical" adjustments to the Code's current ex ante dprecia-
tion schedules. First, some time would elapse between the on-
set of higher inflation and the subsequent legislative
adjustment. Affected taxpayers probably would seek not only
"corrected" rules on a prospective basis, but also some form of
compensation for past slippage. The variety of forms in which
149. "By failing to consider indexing while fully including realized gains,
the reform leaves a situation that may not prove viable, even with relatively
modest inflation rates . . . ." Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 42, at 379; cf.
McLure & Zodrow, supra note 125, at 51 ("It would not be surprising-particu-
larly if inflation accelerates-to see reintroduction of a capital gains
exclusion.").
150. See NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, supra note 136, at
236-38 (indicating that ratio of debt to total financing for publicly held manu-
facturing corporations is approximately 20%, compared to ratio of approxi-
mately 40% for other publicly-held corporations).
151. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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Congress could provide this compensation would increase the
indeterminacy of the tax revision process, thereby diminishing
the likelihood of a simple and limited legislative change. In
1981, for example, owners of depreciable property obtained ex-
tremely generous depreciation allowances, in part almost cer-
tainly to compensate for the cumulative effects of inflation
during the 1970s.152 The 1981 allowances soon appeared exces-
sively generous, a fact that contributed to tax instability during
the succeeding five years. 53
The mechanics of the tax legislative process also pose an
obstacle to "surgical" solutions. Although the tax-writing com-
mittees of Congress maintain an ongoing schedule of hearings
on various topics, and the analytical work of the congressional
and Treasury legislative staffs never ceases, the tax legislative
process is in many respects discontinuous. Given the competing
demands on their attention, legislators can give close attention
to questions of tax revision only for discrete and limited periods
of time. Persons seeking significant changes to the tax laws al-
ways must cross the hurdle of placing tax revision on the legis-
lative agenda as a general matter. 5 4
Once Congress responds to demands to place tax revision
on the legislative agenda, it is unlikely that advocates for relief
in other areas will forgo the resulting opportunity to press their
causes. The resulting lobbying pressure is likely, at the least, to
delay passage of even very limited tax legislation. 5 5 If revision
152. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
154. One commentator has stated:
[An] important criteri[on] for enactable significant Federal tax
legislation is a sufficient "critical mass." This ... implies that for the
Congress to be willing to proceed with a major piece of Federal tax
legislation ... it is necessary that the package have a sufficient critical
mass of provisions to justify proceeding. This explains the pattern of
the chairmen of the tax-writing committees taking relatively few tax
measures to the floor of either the House or the Senate in each Con-
gress. The preferred method of operating is to package various com-
ponents together in a single bill, thus making the job of voting on
such measures less painful than if they were considered as separate
pieces of legislation.
Kies, The Current Political, Budgetary, and Tax Policy Environment Suggests
the Possibility of Major Federal Tax Legislation in the 100th Congress, 35 TAX
NOTES 179, 185 (1987).
155. For example, interested parties attempted to insert "substantive" pro-
visions into legislation designed to make technical corrections to the 1986 Act
and substantially delayed passage of that legislation. See Jones, Finance Staff
Continues Work on Technical Corrections Amendment, 40 TAX NOTES 886
(1988). Congress ultimately passed a technical corrections act in October 1988,
approximately two years after passage of the 1986 Act. Technical and Mfiscel-
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does result, the introduction of additional topics for considera-
tion could cause originally limited tax legislation to "mush-
room" into a comprehensive tax revision, leading to a very
unstable tax environment.1 56 Reliance on periodic legislative
corrections as a substitute for indexation of depreciation al-
lowances seems ill-advised.
It is possible that, even if inflation accelerates significantly,
the political influence of adversely affected groups will not be
sufficient to place the tax legislative process in motion. Indeed,
while inflation apparently has contributed to the initiation of
major tax legislation, including the Revenue Act of 1978157 and
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, these changes proba-
bly responded more to the Code's previous failure to index rate
schedules for inflation than to the Code's lack of indexation of
depreciation allowances and capital gains.1 58 Arguably, now
that Congress has eliminated "bracket creep," inflation no
longer poses a significant threat of tax instability.159
laneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEwS (102 Stat.) 3342.
156. The potential for tax legislation to "mushroom" almost certainly has
increased in recent years, as tax lobby groups have increased their access to
the political process through such means as more aggressive use of political
contributions. See Doernberg & McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and De-
creasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 923-44 (1987); infra
notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
158. Cf. Verdier, The Prospects for Tax Stability, 35 TAX NOTES 171, 172-73
(1987) (suggesting inflation-induced "bracket creep" was major force pushing
tax legislation agenda in 1970s).
159. Id.; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (describing elimina-
tion of "bracket creep" in 1981 Act).
One commentator has observed:
It is bracket indexing... that has sparked the most interest and
congressional action. Most workers have incomes subject to the per-
sonal income tax, but a much smaller number (disproportionately
those with high incomes) have substantial capital gain and interest in-
come. Indexing the latter provisions might be seen as a tax break for
the rich, giving them protection from inflation not enjoyed by other
taxpayers. Moreover, bracket indexing is relatively simple to admin-
ister centrally, requiring only annual changes in tax tables. Indexing
of savings and capital gains, on the other hand, would require com-
plex calculations by taxpayers, opening up new potential for error and
fraud.
R. WEAVER, AUTOMATIC GOVERNMENT: THE POLITICS OF INDEXATION 192-93
(1988).
The persistence of legislative interest in capital gains relief, see infra
notes 169-76 and accompanying text, may indicate, however, that the tax con-
cerns of holders of capital are more compelling politically than the immedi-
ately preceding view suggests.
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While this argument may have force, it necessarily is spec-
ulative because there is no way to know how strong the pres-
sure for change would have been in 1978 and 1981 if the
concern for "bracket creep" had not contributed to it. It is pru-
dent to assume that even with today's indexed rate schedules,
the "capital formation" lobby would prove effective in the
event of markedly accelerated inflation and would succeed in
setting the tax revision process in motion, with potentially
wide-ranging results. More than unadorned political power
would back the lobbyists' arguments: the increase in effective
tax rates on equity-financed capital, owing to inflation's effect
on the real value of depreciation allowances, could have eco-
nomic implications that would concern even the most disinter-
ested legislator. A goal for policymaking should be to build
appropriate mechanisms into the Code now to protect the real
value of depreciation allowances on equity-financed property in
the event of accelerating inflation, in order to forestall the less
predictable results that otherwise might follow another round
of rapid inflation.
Ironically, the largest impediment to the incorporation of
an inflation-adjustment mechanism for depreciation allowances
is the fact that inflation rates remain relatively low. Congress
might be inclined to address the problem of inflation's erosion
of depreciation allowances only after inflation already has sub-
stantially increased effective tax rates on income from depre-
ciable property, at which point legislative action addressed only
to the effects of further inflation may no longer be possible. 160
Currently, however, the political environment may be es-
pecially conducive to the adoption of measures to protect depre-
ciation allowances from the possible effects of marked increases
in inflation. The financial markets remain concerned over the
possibility of resurgent inflation,161 and the currently pending
legislative debate over capital gains policy has focused some leg-
islative attention on inflation's effects on tax burdens.1 62 More-
over, concern over the level of the federal deficit remains high,
which might make Congress responsive to fears that accelerat-
ing inflation, if left uncompensated by the tax code, would raise
political pressure for capital incentives that would exceed the
160. See supra text following note 151.
161. The level of concern over the possibility of resurgent inflation varies,
as might be expected, from day to day. For a representative recent discussion,
see Inflation Stages a Comeback, Bus. WK., Apr. 1989, at 32.
162. See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
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cost of limited indexation for inflation1 63 In addition, leading
tax legislators recognize the enormous strain that the magni-
tude of recent changes has placed on tax administration both in
government and in the private sector. This concern for tax sta-
bility may make legislators especially averse to sweeping tax
changes such as those that could result from renewed calls for
capital incentives in the foreseeable future.164 In sum, congres-
sional leaders may be willing to initiate some form of inflation
"insurance" at the current time, as a relatively inexpensive
means of forestalling expensive and structurally sweeping legis-
lative changes if inflation accelerates in the future.
A safety-valve adjustment to depreciation allowances, simi-
lar to that the House proposed in its version of the 1986 Act,
165
could serve the desired purpose effectively. The safety valve
would compensate for the effects of inflation only to the extent
that inflation exceeds the rate assumed in setting the 1986 Act's
depreciation schedules. Thus, unless inflation accelerates to
unforeseen levels, the safety-valve adjustment would have no
revenue cost at all.166 The safety valve would have some reve-
nue cost in periods of high inflation, but the revenue cost very
likely would be lower than the costs of other measures that
Congress would implement if high inflation were to recur and
Congress had not previously set in place protections against its
effects. Following the former House proposal, Congress could
provide additional revenue protection by setting the "trigger"
rate for implementing inflation adjustments somewhat higher
than the rate of about four percent apparently assumed in set-
ting schedules in the 1986 Act,167 and by indexing for only a
163. See Verdier, supra note 158, at 173-74 (discussing extent to which defi-
cit pressures are likely to bring about significant tax legislation).
164. See, e.g., id at 174-75.
165. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text; see also infra note 181
(describing recently introduced bill for safety-valve indexation of capital
gains).
166. See H. Calkins & M. Durst, supra note 74, at 10; see also infra note
181.
167. Congress actively considered the 1986 Act throughout calendar year
1985, and until the early autumn of 1986. In early 1986, the Congressional
Budget Office forecast inflation, measured by the Consumer Price Index for
Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, at a rate of 3.4% for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 1986, and at rates between 4.2 and 4.4% for the following
five fiscal years. The Administration's forecast was somewhat more optimistic,
projecting a rate of 3.7% for fiscal year 1986, 4.1% for fiscal year 1987, and
rates declining from 3.5% to 2.0% for the following four fiscal years. OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
FISCAL YEAR 1987 at 2-24 to 2-25 (1986). (Inflation actually has occurred at a
1266 [Vol. 73:1217
INFLATION AND THE TAX CODE
portion of the extent to which inflation exceeds the trigger
rate. Moreover, by means of an election described below, Con-
gress could substantially restrict the relief provided to holders
of debt-financed capital.168
The proposed safety-valve adjustment in essence repre-
sents a compromise. It acknowledges the economic significance
of "capital formation" arguments, and provides some measure
of assurance against rising effective tax rates on income from
depreciable capital if inflation increases. It minimizes revenue
costs, however, by offering indexation only to the extent neces-
sary to remove the effects of truly unanticipated inflation. The
safety valve for depreciation would lend additional political sta-
bility to the Code, while protecting the economy from some of
the more serious tax-related shocks that inflation might, in the
absence of adjustments, inflict.
B. THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK FOR CAPITAL GAINS
The political outlook for capital gains taxation suggests
even more strongly the potential utility of a safety valve infla-
tion adjustment. The elimination of a capital gains preference
in the 1986 Act, in return for lower marginal rates, remains
among the most fragile compromises of the 1986 Act.
The Bush Administration recently has proposed reinstating
a preferential rate for gains realized on a large group of capital
assets.169 The Adminstration has based its proposal primarily
on a desire to promote long-term investment, although the Ad-
ministration also has expressed a desire to provide a rough cor-
rection for the effects of inflation. 7 0
pace of 1.6% in calendar year 1986, 3.6% in calendar year 1987 and 4.0% in cal-
endar year 1988. 112 Monthly Labor Review 87 (Mar. 1989)). In the author's
view, a projected rate of 4% probably comports with most observers' expecta-
tions during the period when Congress actively considered the 1986 Act. Cf
STAFF OF THE JOINT COIM. ON TAXATION, supra note 113, at 86 (incorporating
assumption of 4% inflation in comparing competing depreciation proposals in
August 1985); Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 42, at 374 (comments of Mark
Perlis: "In hindsight, the Treasury II proposal for an indexed, accelerated de-
preciation system lost out to a more accelerated, nominal depreciation system
in part because of a failure to understand the effects of inflation, especially if
inflation rates exceeded the prevailing assumed rate of 4 percent.").
168. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
169. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRESI-
DENT'S BUDGET PROPOSALS AFFECTING RECEIPTS 1-16 (1989).
170. The Administration has stated:
Restoring a capital gains tax rate differential is essential to pro-
mote savings, entrepreneurial activity, and risk-taking investments in
new products, processes, and industries that will help keep America
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The Administration has argued that reintroducing a capital
gains differential would increase federal revenues, largely by
encouraging realizations of capital assets, especially in the pe-
riod immediately following the proposal's effective date.171 The
Administration proposal generally limits the preference to in-
vestment assets such as corporate stock, realizations of which
should be most sensitive to changes in tax rates.172 The propo-
sal requires a holding period of only one year for assets sold
through 1992 but increases the holding period to two years in
1993 and to three years in 1995, a feature that could enhance
short-term revenue gains.173 Democratic policymakers in Con-
gress have opposed the Administration proposal, based partly
on skepticism over the Administration's claim that the proposal
will raise revenue, 74 and partly on a desire not to disturb the
competitive and economically strong. At the same time, investors
should be encouraged to extend their horizons and search for invest-
ments with long-term growth potential....
A capital gains differential will also provide a rough adjustment
for taxing inflationary gains that do not represent any increase in real
income.
Id. at 3. The Administration proposal also states:
Although inflation has been kept low under policies of the past
eight years, even low rates of inflation mean that individuals who sell
capital assets at a nominal profit are paying tax on a "fictional" ele-
ment of profit represented by inflation. High rates of inflation, such
as those that existed in the mid and late 1970s, exacerbate the prob-
lem. An income tax should consider only "real" changes in the value
of capital assets - after adjusting for inflation - in order to avoid un-
intended high effective rates of tax that actually lower the real after-
tax value of assets. Current law taxation of nominal capital gains in
full has the perverse result that real gains are overstated (and taxed
too highly) and real losses are understated and, in some cases, actu-
ally converted for tax purposes from losses to gains. A partial exclu-
sion for long-term capital gains provides a rough adjustment for the
inflationary element of capital gains without creating the complexities
and additional record-keeping that a precise inflation adjustment
would require.
Id. at 4. (For discussion of the potential complexities to which the statement
refers, see infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text).
171. Id at 10-14. The Administration has also indicated its expectation
that the capital gains proposal would increase federal revenues by enhancing
economic growth, although the Administration has not incorporated this effect
in its formal revenue estimates. Id. at 11.
172. Assets qualifying for the proposed preference would include "capital
assets" as defined under § 1221 of the Code (generally, all investment assets)
but would not include depreciable or depletable property. The proposal also
denies preferential treatment to gains from the sale of collectibles (for exam-
ple, rare coins and works of art), on the ground that investment in these items
does not promote economic growth. Id, at 5-6, 8-9.
173. Id, at 7, 13.
174. See, e.g., Jones, Taxwriters Greet Bush Proposals with Skepticism, 42
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political compromise of 1986.175
The ultimate resolution of the Administration's capital
gains proposal likely will depend on the outcome of the contro-
versy over revenue effects. If the Administration prevails in ar-
guing that reintroduction of a preference would raise revenue,
Congress probably will adopt some form of exclusion ratio for
capital gains, and further consideration of capital gains reform,
including indexation for inflation, would be unlikely.37 6 If Con-
gress does not accept to the Administration's position on reve-
nue effects, however, the dominant congressional view toward
the capital gain provisions likely would remain that implied by
the committee reports on the 1986 Act: Congress would view a
capital gains preference as a potentially expensive measure that
nevertheless may be justified if Congress should increase tax
rates above their current levels.
In itself, that congressional view would imply a fairly mod-
est "exclusion ratio" in the event of an overall increase in tax
rates. If Congress were, for example, to increase the maximum
marginal individual rate from twenty-eight to thirty-three per-
cent,177 the exclusion ratio needed to keep the maximum rate
TAX NOTES 769, 769 (1989); see also supra note 35 (citing recent discussions of
economic effects of capital gains taxation). The congressional Joint Tax Com-
mittee has released revenue estimates that differ from those of the Adminis-
tration and generally show significant revenue losses from the proposed
capital gains preference. Memorandum from Ronald Pearlman, Chief of Staff,
Joint Committee on Taxation, to Dan Rostenkowski, Chairman, House Ways
and Means Committee (Feb. 23, 1989), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No.
36, at L-49 (Feb. 24, 1989).
175. For example, Robert J. Leonard recently reported that Committee
Chairman Rostenkowski believes that "[r]educing the capital gains tax rate
will destabilize the balance set in the 1986 Act." 42 TAX NOTES 141, 141 (1989).
176. But cf., e.g., Rep. Brown Says Indexing Proposal Has More Chance
Than Capital Gains Rate Cut, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 27, 1989, at G-1
(suggesting that indexing may be more attractive politically then reinstitution
of capital gains exclusion ratio).
177. Currently, while the maximum statutory individual income tax rate is
28%, taxpayers generally must pay a surtax of five percent on income exceed-
ing $43,150, or $71,900 for married couples filing joint returns, until the surtax
has repaid to the Treasury the tax benefit that the taxpayer enjoys from the
Code's 15% rate on the taxpayer's first $17,850 of taxable income ($29,750 for
married couples filing joint returns), as well as the Code's allowance of "per-
sonal exemption" deductions of $2000 each for taxpayers and their dependents.
See I.R.C. § 1(g) (West 1989). (The dollar values indicated in the preceding
sentence are to be indexed for inflation beginning in 1989. I.R.C. § 1(f), (g)
(West 1989)). Many taxpayers therefore pay tax at a marginal rate of 33% un-
til the surtax has fully paid back the benefits of the 15% rate and the personal
exemptions, after which the taxpayer's marginal rate reverts to 28%. To the
extent that legislators are inclined to increase marginal rates, a possible means
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on capital gains at twenty-eight percent would be (33 - 28)/33,
or about fifteen percent.
A resurgence of inflation, however, could generate addi-
tional political pressures and lead to a much higher exclusion
ratio. Historically, the interests of both "venture capitalists"
(whose tax burdens generally are unaffected by inflation)178
and of those with more conventional investments, such as pub-
licly traded stocks and bonds, (the taxation of which inflation
can affect enormously) 179 almost certainly have combined to in-
fluence policymaking for capital gains. Many policymakers
probably have not differentiated consciously between the eco-
nomic situations of venture capitalists and other investors, but
have assumed that the same exclusion ratio that is appropriate
to remedy the effects of inflation on the taxation of conven-
tional investments also will provide an appropriate preference
for venture capital. Because inflation typically represents a
very high proportion of the capital gain on conventional invest-
ments, the apparent tendency to equate the "venture capital"
and inflation problems probably has contributed to a policy of
high exclusion ratios.
Much the same result could obtain if even a small increase
in marginal tax rates were to coincide with a high level of con-
cern over resurgent inflation. Congress then would encounter
facially similar demands to reinstitute a capital gains prefer-
ence to maintain the political-economic compromise of 1986 and
to provide some measure of compensation for the possible ef-
fects of resurgent high inflation. The outcome might be an ex-
clusion ratio for capital gains far greater than a policy of
restoring the 1986 compromise requires.
In essence, the accommodation of 1986 has different impli-
cations for venture capitalists and for more conventional inves-
tors. For venture capitalists, the accommodation is based on a
congressional promise that marginal rates on realized capital
gains will not exceed twenty-eight percent-a quid pro quo, the
validity of which probably does not depend on any particular
rate of inflation. For conventional investors, the implicit polit-
ical accord was more complex. Essentially, conventional inves-
of doing so would be to extend the 33% marginal rate to high-income taxpay-
ers' income in excess of the "payback" point at which the marginal rate cur-
rently reverts to 28%. Cf, e.g., Sens. Harkin, Levin Propose 335 Tax Rate to
Fund Repeal of Catastrophic Surtax, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 1, 1989, at
G-1.
178. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73:12171270
INFLATION AND THE TAX CODE
tors "agreed" in 1986 to accept inflation's magnification of the
effective rate of taxation on capital gains, provided that the
maximum marginal rate remains fixed at twenty-eight percent
and that inflation remains within the range anticipated in en-
acting the 1986 legislation.
Consequently, if an increase in marginal tax rates were to
induce Congress to reinstitute a capital gains preference (and if
Congress were not to view the reinstitution of a capital gains
preference as a source of additional revenue), Congress could
implement a preference at the lowest possible revenue cost
through a two-tiered approach. First, Congress could imple-
ment a relatively low, across-the-board exclusion ratio, reduc-
ing the maximum rate on all capital gains to twenty-eight
percent.18 0 In addition, Congress could implement a mecha-
nism for safety-valve indexation of capital gains similar to that
recommended above for depreciation allowances.18 ' The safety-
valve indexation would permit the taxpayer, at the time of an
asset's sale, to adjust gain to the extent that inflation, over the
holding period of the asset, has exceeded a trigger rate based on
expectations incorporated into the 1986 Act. In enacting safety-
valve indexation, Congress would not seek to eliminate all of
inflation's effects on the taxation of capital gains, but would
seek instead to maintain the political-economic accommodation
of 1986.
This approach would be similar to that of Treasury II,
which employed an exclusion ratio as an across-the-board capi-
tal incentive, but allowed some taxpayers to elect indexation if
the exclusion ratio did not provide ample protection against in-
180. Unfortunately, this would reintroduce to tax planning and enforce-
ment the enormous complexity that previously accompanyed a differential
rate of taxation on long-term capital gains. This portion of the discussion,
however, seeks to identify the most desirable course of action to follow if Con-
gress should decide to reimplement some level of preference for long-term
capital gains.
181. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
Recently, Senator Kasten has introduced legislation that would combine a
50% exclusion ratio for long-term capital gains with "safety-valve" indexation
of asset basis. S. 171, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S525, S527-29 (daily
ed. Jan. 25, 1989). The Kasten bill would index asset basis for inflation to the
extent that inflation exceeds four percent per year.
In support of the "safety valve" portion of the proposal, Senator Kasten
has said: "The indexation of capital gains for inflation above 4 percent will re-
sult in no revenue loss whatsoever .... This is because the Congressional
Budget Office's pro[jected] inflation rates for the next 5 years . . . are no
higher than 4 percent." Id. at S526.
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flation.1 8 2 The approach outlined here differs, however, in that
the exclusion ratio would be somewhat less generous than the
thirty-five-percent exclusion of Treasury II. In addition, in the
belief that the political accord of 1986 incorporates acceptance
of some level of increase in the tax burden on capital gains aris-
ing from inflation, the safety-valve adjustment would not pro-
vide full indexation, but would compensate for inflation only to
the extent that it exceeds the "trigger" rate during the holding
period of the asset.18 3
The political environment surrounding capital gains taxa-
tion remains fluid, and a wide range of outcomes remains possi-
ble. In lieu of an exclusion ratio, Congress conceivably could
adopt the Treasury I approach of indexation, thereby preclud-
ing the need for a safety-valve adjustment.18 4 Any resolution
other than full indexation, however-whether the resolution
incorporates a large exclusion ratio, small exclusion ratio, or no
exclusion ratio at all-will remain desirable, economically and
politically, only within some range of inflation rates. Especially
if Congress implements its resolution at a time when inflation,
and hence inflationary expectations, are comparatively low,
Congress should consider preserving the stability of the Code
through some measure of "safety-valve" inflation protection.
III. THE ROOTS OF THE DECISION TO FORGO
INDEXATION IN THE PAST
Critics have offered numerous arguments against explicit
indexation of the tax base and for relying instead on either ex
ante attempts to accommodate inflation, for example, by accel-
erating depreciation allowances, or on no adjustments for infla-
tion at all. In addition to normative arguments against explicit
indexation, a number of political factors have blocked indexa-
tion.L8 5 While many of the normative arguments against index-
182. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. It also is similar to Senator
Kasten's proposal to combine a 50% exclusion ratio with safety-valve indexa-
tion. See supra note 181.
183. Congress should consider limiting access to the safety valve to taxpay-
ers who agree to relinquish a portion of their interest deductions. This would
limit the full adjustment to sellers of equity-financed capital assets. See infra
notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Blinder, Fixing a Tax Mess-And Keeping Old Loopholes
Closed, Bus. WK., Aug. 1, 1988, at 14 (advocating this approach).
185. Joseph Minarik, an economist and adviser to Senator Bradley, reports
that in drafting the Bradley-Gephardt reform plan, an important predecessor
to the 1986 Act, "[iut was concluded that indexing... would cause prohibitive
administrative and political difficulties, which later developments proved to
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ation have force, they do not justify the Code's current
complete absence of protection should inflation accelerate
markedly in the future. Moreover, although political con-
straints may prevent full-scale indexation proposals, they
should not preclude the more limited safety-valve approach
suggested here.
A. NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INDEXATION
1. Administrative Complexity
The most important normative argument that has been
raised against indexation is that indexation would dispropor-
tionately add to the Code's administrative complexity. The po-
tential complications arising from a comprehensive system of
indexation are indeed significant. Capital gains indexation, for
example, would require an adjustment to an asset's historical
cost basis at the time a taxpayer sells the asset to reflect the
effects of inflation since the taxpayer acquired the asset. In
practice, however, many events might have occurred since the
original purchase that would complicate computation of the as-
set's basis. Investors in stocks and mutual funds, for example,
often arrange to "reinvest" their dividends. Consequently, the
investment will have many different bases, reflecting reinvest-
ments throughout the period of ownership.1 86 Although the
calculations required to index these numerous separate bases
are conceptually simple, they could be burdensome to a tax-
payer seeking to complete a return without professional assist-
ance. Changes to the tax basis of an investment asset during its
holding period can result, moreover, from many additional fac-
tors, including the expenditure of legal fees incurred in a law-
suit to quiet title to stocks, bonds, or other investments, and
engineering work performed to ready a parcel of land for
development.1 8 7
Despite these admitted complexities, however, critics prob-
ably have overstated the administrative difficulties of indexing
asset basis. First, the complexities should not seriously affect
the indexation of depreciation allowances. Taxpayers compute
depreciation deductions annually, maintaining records of ad-
justed asset basis continuously. Adjusting allowances for infla-
tion on a quarterly or annual basis, according to a table
be correct." Minarik, How Tax Reform Came About, 37 TAx NoTES 1359, 1365
(emphasis added).
186. See Sunley, supra note 129, at 624; Wetzler, supra note 38, at 425.
187. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (as amended in 1987).
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provided by the government, should require little additional
effort.1 8 8
The problems of indexing capital gains are more serious.
Nevertheless, when "retail" investors participate in dividend
reinvestment plans and similar arrangements, the investors in
most cases deal with entities that keep computerized records of
the amounts and dates of all reinvestments.18 9 These entities
easily should be able to compute the proper indexation of asset
basis for their customers, either at the time of sale or as part of
the customer's regular monthly or quarterly statement. The
expense involved should be minimal. In other instances, in
which the taxpayer has adjusted an asset's basis during the
holding period for reasons other than reinvestment plans, the
taxpayer's affairs almost certainly will be sufficiently complex
that the taxpayer will employ professional assistance in prepar-
ing returns, and the computations required for indexation
should be trivial to a trained accountant.
Any system of capital gains taxation, even one that offers
neither price adjustments nor a long-term capital gains prefer-
ence, involves considerable administrative complexity. In any
system of capital gains taxation, taxpayers must maintain
records of asset basis. Similarly, even without price indexation,
a taxpayer who sells a portion of a block of assets accumulated
over a period of time (a block accumulated gradually through a
reinvestment program, for example) must follow complex rules
to identify precisely which assets are being sold, in order to
know which of many different asset bases to use.190 Indexation
188. Some minor complications might arise from the government's fre-
quent retroactive revisions of price indices. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, supra note 25, at 8. Revisions in price indices tend to be minor,
however, and an indexing plan should not require taxpayers to change depre-
ciation allowances retroactively to reflect such revisions. If it desired, Con-
gress could modify future inflation adjustments to account for revisions in
previously reported price indices, in order to correct for revisions at least
roughly over time.
189. Cf. Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 42, at 359 ("One suspects.., that
in the large majority of ... cases, individuals deal with financial institutions
that have access to the technology to implement indexing without undue
difficulty.").
190. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer purchases one share of Acme
Corporation stock in 1985 for $100 and then purchases an additional share in
1986 for $120. In 1989, the taxpayer sells one of the two shares of Acme stock
for $150. The taxpayer must determine which of the two shares was sold-the
share with a basis of $100, giving rise to a gain of $50, or the share with a basis
of $120, giving rise to a gain of $30. United States tax law generally allows the
shareholder significant latitude in selecting the particular shares deemed to be
sold. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(c) (as amended in 1980). Indexing capital gains
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of capital gains will neither remove nor substantially magnify
these complexities. Indexation might, however, reduce the
need for frequent revisions of the tax code, thus lessening the
likelihood of the administrative complexity and economic dis-
ruption that attends any substantial tax revision. 91
2. The Argument That Indexation Is Impracticable Because
of the Need to Take into Account Inflation's Effects on
Debt: The Problem and a Suggested Approach to a
Solution
Although inflation represents an unmitigated tax detri-
ment to the holder of an equity-financed depreciable or capital
asset, the ability to deduct in full all interest payments, includ-
ing the inflation component of interest, partially offsets the
negative tax effects of inflation for holders of debt-financed as-
sets. This has led many to suggest that the tax laws should of-
fer indexation of depreciation allowances and capital gains only
to holders of equity-financed assets. 19 2 Policymakers some-
times assume, however, that limiting indexation only to equity-
financed assets would require administratively complex "trac-
ing" rules, or similar attribution rules to determine whether a
would require neither more nor less complex "identification" rules than would
a system of capital gains taxation not incorporating inflation adjustments.
191. The tax laws of the United Kingdom have indexed capital gains since
1982, offering a body of administrative experience useful for implementing in-
dexation in the United States. See COiPARATIVE TAX SYsTEMS: EUROPE, CAN-
ADA, AND JAPAN 300-01 (J. Pechman ed. 1987) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE TAX
SYSTEMS]; Note, Indexation of Capital Gains, 1982 BRIT. TAX REV. 131, 150-58
(describing implementation of capital gains indexation in 1982); Note, Capital
Gains Tax, 1985 BRrr. TAX REv. 142, 154-57 (describing modification of indexa-
tion in 1985 that eliminated requirement that taxpayer hold assets for one year
to qualify for indexation, and that permits indexation even if it would result in
taxable loss on realization).
Much of the complexity of indexation in the United Kingdom seems to
have arisen from difficulties in applying transitional rules, a topic that would
require careful attention if Congress were to implement capital gains indexa-
tion, including the proposed safety-valve indexation, in the United States. See
Gunn, The Overgrown Jungle, 1987 TAXATION 537, 537 (criticizing some admin-
istrative aspects of United Kingdom indexing rules). Almost certainly, Con-
gress should offer safety-valve indexation only for inflation occurring after the
date of enactment, and, following the example of the 1982 revisions to indexa-
tion in the United Kingdom, should offer the taxpayer the option of basing in-
dexation for assets held on the effective date on either the historical cost basis
of the asset or on the asset's fair market value as of the effective date. Cf. In-
land Revenue Press Release, Capital Gains Rebasing and Indexation (May 25,
1989) (describing recent administrative action dealing with assets held as of ef-
fective date of indexing plan).
192. See Gann, supra note 135, at 131-34.
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taxpayer's depreciable and capital assets are, in fact, debt-fi-
nanced. 1-93 Indeed, some have suggested that the administrative
problems of limiting indexation only to equity-financed assets
are so severe, and the economic distortions that would arise
from failing to limit indexation to equity-financed assets suffi-
ciently troubling, as to render attempts to index the tax base
for inflation inadvisable. 194
Indexing depreciation allowances and capital gains on both
debt- and equity-financed assets, while leaving the taxation of
interest payments and receipts unadjusted for inflation, would
result in economic distortions for a number of reasons. This
practice would result in higher after-tax rates of return on
193. See id. at 131 (stating that allowing indexation only for equity-fi-
nanced portion of depreciable asset "raises practical problems of calculating
the percentage of depreciable assets which are debt-financed"); id. at 134 (not-
ing that "indexation could be limited to equity-financed capital assets, but such
a limitation requires tracing rules to determine to what extent the indexed as-
sets are debt-financed"). The likely administrative burdens of tracing rules
and similar attribution rules are daunting. The simplest attribution rule, and
the most defensible economically, consists of a presumption that all debt car-
ried by the taxpayer "finances" the taxpayer's depreciable or capital assets, ex-
cept to the extent that the total outstanding principal of the debt exceeds the
market value of the taxpayer's depreciable or capital assets. Even this simple
rule would require that the taxpayer estimate both the principal value of in-
debtedness and the total market value of depreciable and capital assets on a
yearly basis.
The Code does have a number of rules limiting interest deductions that
require some form of tracing. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 265(a)(2) (West 1989) (disallow-
ing deduction of "[i]nterest on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase
or carry" tax-exempt bonds); id. § 163(h) (disallowing deduction of "personal
interest," except for "qualified residence interest"); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-
8T (1987) (providing complex tracing rules to implement "personal interest"
limitation of § 163(h)). These rules have been the source of enormous admin-
istrative complexity with apparently unsatisfactory results. For recent discus-
sions of "tracing" and similar attribution rules, see, for example, Block, The
Trouble with Interest: Reflections on Interest Deductions After the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 689, 716-75 (1988); Johnson, Is an Interest
Deduction Invevitable?, 6 VA. TAX REV. 123, 170-82 (1986); Koppelman, Tax
Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1207-16 (1988);
Shakow, Confronting the Problem of Tax Arbitrage, 43 TAX L. REV. 1, 26-32
(1987); see also Galvin, The Deduction of Nonbusiness Interest: An Exercise in
Planned Confusion, 41 TAx LAW. 803, 820-24 (1988) (discussing application of
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T); see generally M. GRAErz, supra note 25, at 458-
59 (raising general doubts concerning administrability of Code sections that
currently require tracing rules).
194. Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 42, largely represents an attempt to
confront this argument. The authors conclude that the merits of a partial in-
dexation system must be evaluated on the basis of careful economic analysis.
"[P]artial indexing is not necessarily worse than the alternatives. It depends
upon the details." Id. at 372.
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debt-financed depreciable and capital assets than on similar as-
sets that taxpayers finance with equity, thereby exacerbating
the tax code's tendency to favor debt over equity.195 Allowing
taxpayers fully to index depreciation and capital gains even on
debt-financed assets would offer an artificial inducement to
purchase those particular depreciable and capital assets, such as
buildings, that are especially amenable to debt-financing. 196
Moreover, even leaving aside the question of economic distor-
tion, allowing holders of debt-financed assets full indexation of
depreciation and capital gains would impose an unwarranted
revenue loss on the Treasury. In short, it seems advisable on a
number of grounds to limit the extent to which inflation adjust-
ments, including safety-valve indexation, are made available to
holders of debt-financed assets.
Congress should consider limiting the inflation adjust-
ments of holders of debt-financed assets without the need for
tracing rules or similar mechanisms, by permitting the tax-
payer to adjust depreciation allowances and capital gains for in-
flation only if the taxpayer agrees to the partial disallowance of
interest deductions on all of the taxpayer's indebtedness.197
195. The tax laws already significantly favor debt over equity by permitting
deductions under the corporate tax for interest paid to creditors, but not for
dividends paid to shareholders. Concern over this problem, which has existed
throughout the history of the income tax, is now especially acute, because of
the recent spate of "leveraged buyouts" and similar transactions that substi-
tute corporate debt for equity. See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, FEDERAL INcOME TAX AsPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANcIAL STRuc-
TURES (1989) (booklet prepared for members of House Ways & Means and
Senate Finance Committees). It is unlikely that Congress would want to pro-
vide additional incentives for debt formation by permitting inflation indexa-
tion of depreciation or capital gains without requiring holders of debt-financed
assets to relinquish some of the tax benefits arising from inflation.
196. Cf Boskin, A Closer Look at Tax Neutrality Toward Investment, 29
TAX NOTEs 652, 653 n.41 (1985) ("A ... conceptual problem is whether all
types of assets, and investments in all industries, have equal access to debt as
opposed to equity finance."); Summers, A Fair Tax Act That's Bad for Busi-
ness, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 53, 55 (observing that tax system his-
torically has been biased in favor of investment in buildings, in part because
buildings "can carry heavy tax-favored debt"). Prior to the 1986 Act, the Code
implicitly took this advantage into account by providing more generous cost
recovery rules, largely through the investment tax credit, for equipment than
for buildings. The 1986 Act eliminated this practice. See Auerbach, supra note
116, at 77 (indicating that 1986 Act, unlike prior law, provides similar effective
tax rates on income from industrial machinery and on income from industrial
buildings).
197. Cf. C. STEUERLE, supra note 122, at 196 ("Fractional exclusion of inter-
est payments (in effect, partial indexing) could be applied to businesses and
corporations that have high debt-to-equity ratios or make substantial use of
other tax preferences.").
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Under the suggested approach, the "price" for electing indexa-
tion of depreciation or capital gains would be an agreement to
forgo interest deductions to the approximate extent necessary
to negate the tax advantage that the taxpayer otherwise would
enjoy from the deduction of the inflation component of inter-
est. Congress would base the percentage of interest deductions
that it would require the taxpayer to forgo on economic esti-
mates of the extent to which borrowers, on average, actually
"keep" the tax benefits from deducting the inflation component
of interest, as opposed to losing them as a result of lenders
passing along their increased tax burdens from inflation.198 If
it is estimated, for example, that borrowers retain sixty percent
of the benefit from deducting the inflation component of inter-
est, then as a condition for adjusting depreciation allowances or
capital gains for inflation, Congress would require taxpayers to
forgo deduction of sixty percent of the inflation component of
interest, estimated by means similar to those of Treasury I.
Although it might seem that the proposed election 99
would raise many of the disadvantages of Treasury I's interest
indexation proposal, the administrative difficulties of the pro-
posal would be limited because only taxpayers with relatively
low outstanding debt would "elect into" the proposed indexa-
tion system. For these taxpayers, the tax advantage of indexing
depreciation allowances and capital gains would outweigh the
tax cost of relinquishing a portion of the interest deduction.
Taxpayers with relatively large outstanding debt would find
that the tax costs of relinquishing a portion of the interest de-
duction would be greater than the tax advantages of indexing
depreciation and capital gains, and these taxpayers would not
198. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
199. Casting the suggested approach in the form of an election helps to il-
lustrate the proposal's conceptual basis, but it may pose difficulties to the ex-
tent that policymakers have come to associate taxpayer elections, of various
kinds, with administrative complexity. Congress could achieve a result virtu-
ally identical to that of the mechanism outlined here, without the need for an
election, by allowing taxpayers inflation adjustments to depreciation or capital
gains only to the extent that the adjustments exceed the estimated portion of
the taxpayer's interest deductions that results in an inflation-related benefit to
the taxpayer; that is, the same portion of the interest deduction that the tax-
payer would be required to forgo under the suggested election. Taxpayers
with very large interest deductions relative to their depreciation deductions or
capital gain realizations would essentially be rendered ineligible for inflation
adjustments, just as would happen under the suggested election. The follow-
ing discussion, and the technical comments toward the conclusion of this Arti-
cle, should be adaptable readily to a system that does not involve a taxpayer
election.
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make the suggested election. Thus, the proposed system proba-
bly would not affect taxpayers, such as banks, that are in the
business of borrowing and relending money.20 0
A set of examples can illustrate the workings of the pro-
posed election. The examples are based on Table 1 in Section
I(B) of this Article,20 1 which depicts the economic depreciation,
in the absence of inflation, of an automobile with an original
purchase price of $10,000. The examples also incorporate the
assumptions concerning the relationship between real and nom-
inal interest rates on which the Treasury based its 1984 interest
indexation proposal. 20 2
Table 1 indicates that during the first year of the automo-
bile's life, it depreciates economically to the approximate ex-
tent of $3491. Assume now that inflation occurs at a rate of five
percent during the year. If the taxpayer were to index depreci-
ation for inflation, the proposal would permit the taxpayer to
increase the depreciation deduction during the year by five per-
cent, from $3491 to $3666.203
Following the methodology of the 1984 Treasury proposal,
the assumed inflation rate of five percent implies a total, nomi-
nal interest rate of eleven percent.20 4 The 1984 Treasury propo-
sal thus would estimate that of all interest payments that the
taxpayer makes, five-elevenths--45.5%-represents the infla-
tion component.20 5 Assume further that, based on empirical ev-
200. See supra note 129. These taxpayers generally would have outstand-
ing indebtedness substantially exceeding the value of their depreciable and
capital assets, and therefore would not elect into the proposed system.
It might be argued that the suggested election would operate harshly with
respect to asset holders who are both lenders and borrowers. These taxpayers
receive tax benefits from inflation's effects on interest payments only to the
extent of their net outstanding indebtedness. Arguably, then, the proposed
election should require the partial disallowance only of net, not gross, interest
payments.
Requiring the partial disallowance only of net interest payments, how-
ever, effectively would grant taxpayers who make the election an implicit in-
dexation of their interest receipts-a benefit that would not be afforded to
taxpayers generally, in the absence of comprehensive indexation such as that
of Treasury I. Thus, if Congress chooses to make use of the election offered
for consideration here, it probably should require the partial disallowance of
the taxpayer's gross, as opposed to net, interest payments.
201. Supra text accompanying notes 76-77.
202. Supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Table 2, text following notes 76-77.
204. Supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
205. The suggested election's incorporation of the Treasury I approach of
estimating a single fractional "inflation component" for all interest payments
could pose some relative disadvantage for borrowers of risky debt. Interest
1989] 1279
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
idence, it is estimated that borrowers on average "keep" sixty
percent of the tax benefit from deducting the inflation compo-
nent of interest. The proposed election thus would require the
taxpayer to forgo deduction of sixty percent of the estimated
inflation component of interest-that is, sixty percent of 45.5%,
or 27.3%-on all of the taxpayer's indebtedness, in return for
the benefit of indexing depreciation allowances. (In actual
practice, the taxpayer would not be required to make these cal-
culations. Rather, the tax return and accompanying instruc-
tions simply would state that in return for claiming the benefit
of indexing depreciation, the taxpayer would be required to re-
duce interest deductions by a specified percentage.)
Suppose now that the taxpayer, who has purchased a de-
preciable automobile for $10,000, and who has no other depre-
ciable or capital assets, has $20,000 of total debt outstanding.
Because the amount of the outstanding debt exceeds the value
of the automobile, the taxpayer effectively has debt-financed
the entire value of the automobile. Assuming a tax rate of
twenty-five percent, the benefit to the taxpayer from indexing
depreciation on the automobile, during the first year of the au-
tomobile's useful life, would be twenty-five percent of the
amount by which indexation increased the taxpayer's deprecia-
tion allowance. As indicated immediately above, indexation
would increase the taxpayer's depreciation allowance from
$3491 to $3666, an increase of $175. At a twenty-five-percent
tax rate, indexation thus would decrease the investor's tax bill
by $43.75.
payments on relatively risky debt include not only an inflation component, but
also a risk premium. Thus, the inflation component represents a smaller pro-
portion of interest paid on risky debt than on other debt. An ideal indexation
system would require borrowers of risky debt to forgo deduction of a smaller
percentage of their interest payments than other borrowers.
The drafters of Treasury I apparently were willing to accept this distor-
tion as a price for the overall benefits of indexing under the plan. Because the
Treasury I plan involved not only the partial disallowance of interest deduc-
tions but the partial exclusion of interest receipts, the plan's overtaxation of
borrowers of risky debt was to some extent offset by an undertaxation of lend-
ers of risky debt, a situation that would not exist under the suggested election.
Nevertheless, under the suggested election, only taxpayers whose asset values
are relatively high compared to their loan balances would elect into the index-
ation system. These taxpayers should, by and large, be those with relatively
risk-free debt. Thus, any potential disadvantage to high-risk borrowers may be
of limited practical significance. The significance might be still lower if Con-
gress implements the election in connection with the partial exclusion of capi-
tal gains, a measure which, generally speaking, would tend to offer special
advantages to speculative investments.
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To benefit from this reduction, however, the taxpayer
would need to forgo 27.3% of the otherwise allowable deduction
for interest on the taxpayer's total indebtedness of $20,000.
Based on the assumption of an eleven-percent interest rate, the
taxpayer's total interest payments on the $20,000 of indebted-
ness would be $2200. As the price of indexing depreciation al-
lowances the taxpayer would be required to forgo deduction of
27.3% of this amount, or $600.60. At a tax rate of twenty-five
percent, forgoing the deduction of $600.60 would result in a tax
cost of $150.15. The tax detriment from relinquishing a portion
of the interest deduction thus would outweigh the tax benefit
of $43.75 from indexing depreciation allowances, and the tax-
payer accordingly would not elect to accept the benefits of in-
dexation. Quite properly, this taxpayer-whose indebtedness is
very large compared to the value of the taxpayer's depreciable
assets-would not enjoy the benefits of depreciation indexation.
A different result would obtain if the taxpayer's total in-
debtedness were only $1000, rather than $20,000. Under this as-
sumption, the taxpayer has financed the depreciable
automobile primarily from equity. For this taxpayer, the tax
benefit from indexing depreciation allowances would remain at
twenty-five percent of $175, or $43.75. The taxpayer's total in-
terest expense is $110 (eleven percent of $1000), and the tax-
payer would be required to forgo indexation of 27.3% of this
amount ($30.03), yielding a tax cost (at a tax rate of twenty-five
percent) of $7.51. This cost is much less than the tax benefit of
$43.75 from indexing depreciation allowances. The holder of
the equity-financed asset therefore will "elect into" the indexa-
tion system. As a consequence of accepting indexation of de-
preciation allowances, however, the taxpayer will relinquish
the inflation-related benefits associated with the taxpayer's
$1000 of debt.20 6
206. As an additional example, it is useful to consider the operation of the
proposed election with respect to a taxpayer who fully debt-finances the
$10,000 depreciable asset, and who has no other debt outstanding. For this tax-
payer, the benefit from indexing the depreciation allowance during the first
year remains at $43.75. In order to receive this benefit, the taxpayer would be
required to forgo deduction of 27.3% of $1100 in interest on the taxpayer's
$10,000 indebtedness. Thus, the taxpayer would lose a deduction of $300.30, re-
sulting in a tax cost (at a 25% tax rate) of $75.08. The holder of the fully debt-
financed asset thus would not elect to index depreciation in the first year of
the asset's life.
By the final (fifth) year of the asset's life, the result is different. In that
year, by reference to Tables 1 and 3 in the text, the difference between the
unindexed depreciation allowance ($974) and the indexed depreciation allow-
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The mechanics of the election would differ to some extent,
depending on whether taxpayers seek indexation of deprecia-
tion allowances or of capital gains. When taxpayers seek index-
ation only of depreciation allowances, they could make the
election simply on a year-by-year basis; that is, for the particu-
lar year in which the taxpayer seeks to index depreciation al-
lowances, the taxpayer would be required to accept partial
reduction of the interest deduction only for that year. This rel-
atively simple structure is possible because the Code allows de-
preciation deductions on a year-by-year "accrual" basis. Thus, a
single year's depreciation allowances can be matched, as an eco-
ance ($1243) is $269. At a tax rate of 25%, deduction of this amount yields the
taxpayer a tax savings of $67.25.
In the fifth year, the remaining fair market value of the taxpayer's depre-
ciable asset will be $1243. This can be seen from Table 3, which sets forth the
inflation-adjusted depreciation deductions. The table indicates that in infla-
tion-adjusted terms, the asset depreciates by $1243 during the fifth year, at the
end of which the asset's inflation-adjusted value is zero. This indicates that
the asset's inflation-adjusted value as of the beginning of the year was $1243.
Assuming that the remaining principal balance of the taxpayer's loan, as of
the beginning of the year, is equal to the asset's fair market value, a result that
is consistent with the underlying assumption of a fully debt-financed asset, the
outstanding loan balance will be $1243. The taxpayer's interest payment for
the year therefore will be 11% of $1243, or $136.73. Forgoing 27.3% of this de-
duction ($37.33) will impose a tax cost (at a 25% tax rate) of $9.33. Because
this is less than the tax savings of $67.25 from indexing depreciation, the tax-
payer will elect to index in the fifth year.
This example has several lessons for those who would design an election
system such as that suggested here. First, a taxpayer whose depreciable asset
is fully debt-financed will choose to enjoy some indexation of depreciation
over the asset's life. This result is appropriate. For the taxpayer whose depre-
ciable assets are exactly 100% debt-financed, inflation's detrimental effect on
depreciation allowances should, in fact, outweigh the tax benefits accruing
through inflation's effects on the interest deduction, because a portion of these
benefits are likely to be "taken" from the taxpayer in the form of higher inter-
est charges imposed by lenders. See supra notes 137-45 and accompanying
text.
An additional lesson is that some taxpayers will, rationally, decide to opt
into the indexation system in some years but not in others. This underscores
the desirability of permitting taxpayers to elect depreciation indexation on an
annual basis. See text immediately following this note. The rules generally
should permit the taxpayer who opts into the system midway through an as-
set's life to index the depreciation allowance for the year in question on a cu-
mulative basis, taking into account inflation from the point at which the asset
was purchased. Otherwise, the taxpayer will not receive a full measure of in-
flation protection. The mechanics of providing this cumulative adjustment
should be fairly simple for the taxpayer who, as would normally be the prac-
tice with respect to depreciable property, has maintained records of asset basis
from year to year. Cf S. 171, supra note 181, § 201, 135 CONG. REC. at S527-28
(setting forth similar cumulative adjustment mechanism for indexing capital
gains).
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nomic matter, against the interest deductions accruing to the
taxpayer in that same year.
The election cannot be quite so simple when the taxpayer
seeks indexation of capital gains. Under the rule of realization,
the capital gains reported in a given year will reflect income ac-
crued not only in that year, but throughout the asset's holding
period. As a theoretical matter, Congress should require a tax-
payer who elects indexation of capital gains on an asset dis-
posed of in a given year to relinquish a portion of the interest
deduction for each year during which the taxpayer held the
asset.
Congress could provide this theoretically proper treatment
by requiring taxpayers to elect, in the year in which they origi-
nally purchase an asset, whether to participate in the indexa-
tion program with respect to that asset. Such a requirement
probably would be unfair, however, to taxpayers unable to pre-
dict the extent to which they would maintain debt balances
during the asset's holding period. Alternatively, under a less
exact but simpler election mechanism, the taxpayer would not
be required to elect into the system at the time the taxpayer
purchased an asset, but instead could elect indexation at the
time the taxpayer sells the asset. As a condition to receiving in-
dexation of the capital gain on sale, the Code would require the
taxpayer to accept, retroactively, a partial reduction of interest
deductions for a specified number of years (perhaps three
years, corresponding to the normal statute of limitations for
amending income tax returns), or for the holding period of the
asset if shorter. (This simplified method could offer taxpayers
an economic advantage when they hold assets for long periods
of time.207 This advantage, although admittedly resulting in
some distortion in favor of holding debt-financed assets, should
be relatively minor. It also might be consistent with a legisla-
tive desire to mitigate "lock-in" by providing some advantage to
assets with long holding periods.)
While this Article offers the proposed election as a compo-
nent of a "safety valve" indexation plan, the election should be
adaptable to any program of indexation of depreciation or capi-
tal gain, whether explicit or implicit. Congress could, for exam-
ple, require the election as a condition of eligibility for any
reinstated capital gain preference (which presumably would be
207. That is, a taxpayer holding an asset for longer than three years could
enjoy indexation of gain that accrued in some years for which the taxpayer
would not be required to reduce interest deductions.
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intended, in part, as a substitute for indexation), or as a condi-
tion of eligibility for the Code's current, accelerated deprecia-
tion allowances (which apparently are intended to provide
some ex ante protection against inflation).208 Alternatively,
Congress might not require the proposed election as a condition
to enjoying the benefits of the Code's existing de facto indexa-
tion provisions, but might require the election as a condition to
enjoying any additional indexation.20 9
The proposed coupling of indexation with an elective limi-
tation of interest deductions inevitably would involve some
level of imprecision. The determination of the portion of inter-
est to be disallowed would rest on fairly rough estimates of the
extent of the inflation component of interest, and of the portion
of the tax advantages from inflation that borrowers lose in the
form of higher interest charged by lenders. The resulting dis-
tortions, however, should be relatively small, and probably not
sufficiently systematic, or measurable by the taxpayer, to raise
opportunities for significant manipulation. Even if the distor-
tions were fairly large, the election mechanism might well
provide fewer distortions, and fewer opportunities for manipu-
lation, than the Code's historical, and with respect to acceler-
ated depreciation, current, approach of making available the
full benefits of implicit indexation of inflation without requir-
ing any "payback" from holders of debt-financed assets. Unless
Congress introduces full indexation of debt into the Code (a re-
mote possibility, given the administrative difficulties involved),
it should consider an election mechanism along the lines sug-
gested here in connection with any future proposals to index
the income tax base, implicity or explicitly, for inflation.
208. But see Bulow & Summers, supra note 72, passim (suggesting that
Code's current depreciation allowances may be lower than those necessary to
bring about investment neutrality). The Bulow-Summers analysis implies that
Congress should proceed with caution in limiting depreciation to estimated
economic depreciation, even to holders of debt-financed assets.
209. If Congress employs the proposed election in connection with safety-
valve indexation of depreciation or capital gains, it should not require the asset
owner to relinquish the full inflation-related tax advantage associated with
debt, but only the portion attributable to that component of inflation for
which the taxpayer receives indexation under the safety valve. Thus, if a
safety valve provides for indexation of depreciation allowances for only 75% of
the extent to which inflation exceeds 5%, Congress should require taxpayers
to relinquish only that portion of the interest deduction attributable to the
same amount of inflation. It would be unrealistic to expect asset owners to
forgo the full tax benefits associated with the inflation component of interest,
in return for only limited inflation indexation of depreciation allowances and
capital gains.
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3. Other Substantive Arguments Against Indexation
a. Revenue Considerations
Arguably, the Code's current lack of indexation mecha-
nisms is desirable, because it permits the revenue yield of the
tax system to grow over time to help "pay for" the relatively
low marginal rates introduced by the 1986 Act.2 10 Apparently,
because the increased tax collections (in real terms) from an
unindexed system are likely to occur only gradually, and be-
cause the increased tax burden is to some extent uncertain, the
prospect of increased tax collections poses a relatively low
threat to those taxpayers who would be affected. Indexation
thus becomes a relatively easy pawn to trade in return for more
immediate or certain benefits, such as those accruing from
lower rates.
The importance of this phenomenon in facilitating the res-
olution of legislative debates should not be underestimated. If
those policymakers crafting the legislative compromise in 1986
had not relied on the tendency of some participants in the pro-
cess to discount the tax burdens likely to arise from a lack of
indexation, passage of a tax bill in 1986 might have been impos-
sible. Nevertheless, the same tendency to discount the prospec-
tive tax effects of inflation that aids political compromise in the
first instance may magnify the intensity of the political reaction
if inflation should accelerate and the detrimental effects of in-
flation "suddenly" appear. A revenue-raising strategy that re-
lies too heavily on the tendency to discount the potential effects
of inflation is inherently prone to instability, as well as to dis-
torted tax burdens on income from capital.
The proposed safety-valve indexation scheme may repre-
sent an attractive compromise between a desire to raise reve-
nue by letting the real tax burden increase to some extent with
inflation, and a desire to limit the extent to which inflation can
inflict political instability and economic distortion on the tax
system. So long as inflation remains within anticipated bounds,
a safety-valve system will permit inflation to affect the real
210. McLure reports, for example, that some participants in the delibera-
tions leading to the 1986 Act "were... concerned that indexing of depreciation
allowances would create a revenue 'time bomb' that would explode sometime
beyond 1990. That is, they feared that if inflation accelerated, depreciation al-
lowances would increase accordingly and revenues would be lower than under
an unindexed system." McLure, supra note 30, at 1654 (footnote omitted).
The indexation of capital gains and its rough substitute, a capital gains exclu-
sion ratio, also seem to have fallen prey to revenue concerns. See J. BIRNBAUM
& A. MURRAY, supra note 62, at 225-27.
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value of federal revenues. If inflation exceeds the "trigger"
rate, however, the safety valve will limit the extent to which
real tax burdens will increase, thus protecting the tax system
against very profound economic distortions and very strong
political pressures for tax restructuring.
211
b. Arguments Relating to Progressivity
An additional normative argument against indexation re-
lates to the tax system's progressivity. Virtually by definition,
beneficial interests in depreciable and capital assets tend to be
held disproportionately by persons of relatively high wealth.
An unindexed system may provide a politically attractive
means of increasing the system's progressivity over time, by in-
creasing the real rate of taxation on income from wealth in pe-
riods of high inflation.212
Questions of income tax progressivity are intrinsically sub-
jective, and it is difficult to evaluate the normative value of at-
tempting to increase progressivity through the effects of
inflation on the tax base. Nevertheless, even if a policy of fos-
tering progressivity through the effects of inflation is desirable,
it should be subject to limitations. As was true with respect to
a policy of eschewing indexation to raise revenue, a policy of
avoiding indexation of the tax base to enhance progressivity
may be desirable within some range of possible inflation rates,
but almost certainly will lead to excessive tax burdens on in-
come from capital at higher rates.213 A desire for progressivity
therefore may justify a decision not to adopt complete indexa-
tion, but it should not prevent Congress from adopting meas-
ures, such as the safety-valve system proposed here, to keep the
effects of inflation within predetermined bounds.
211. Canada has employed a "safety valve" compromise in its indexation of
rate brackets, a form of indexation for which the tradeoff between increased
revenues and the distortion of tax burdens is especially acute. Since 1985, Can-
ada has indexed rate brackets only for inflation exceeding three percent. See
COMPARATIVE TAX SYsTEMs, supra note 191, at 348.
212. Cf. Kies, supra note 154, at 184 (describing role of distributional con-
cerns in bringing about elimination of capital gains preference in 1986); see
generally Bailey, Inflationary Distortions and Taxes, in INFLATION AND THE
INCOME TAX, supra note 15, at 291, 300-01, 303-04 (describing progressive ef-
fects of inflation's distortion of tax base).
213. Cf. Bailey, supra note 212, at 323 (comments of Peter Diamond) ("In
the end. . ., we are left with the simple fact that inflation results in a tax on
wealth. A tax on wealth does not bother me, but its random size does.").
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c. The Argument That an Unindexed System Offers
"Automatic Stabilizers" Against Inflation
Commentators often have argued that Congress should
avoid indexing the tax system, because an unindexed system of-
fers built-in correctives for inflation through both economic
and political mechanisms. Economically, an unindexed system
is said to offer an "automatic stabilizer" by increasing tax reve-
nues in the event of inflation, thereby dampening aggregate de-
mand.2 14  Politically, an unindexed system may counter
inflation by giving important interest groups a strong economic
incentive to favor policies that lessen the likelihood of
inflation. 215
As an economic matter, the "automatic stabilizer" argu-
ment was more compelling prior to the indexation of the rate
structure in the 1981 Act.216 Before the introduction of bracket
indexation, Congress could expect inflation to "bump" a great
many taxpayers into higher brackets, thereby accomplishing a
broadly based tax increase that might have served a useful
counter-cyclical purpose.2 1 7 Now that Congress has eliminated
"bracket-creep," however, inflation increases the real value of
tax revenues by increasing specifically the tax burden on in-
come from capital. At least in the recent "stagflationary"
past,2 18 high levels of inflation have tended to coincide with rel-
214. See, e.g., id. at 313-14 (describing "automatic stabilizer" argument). In
1978, the Senate Finance Committee favored an increase in the capital gains
"exclusion ratio" rather than explicit indexation, based in part on the argu-
ment that "since the [exclusion ratio] is constant, unlike the automatic adjust-
ments generally provided for in various indexation proposals, it should not
tend to exacerbate inflationary increases." S. REP. No. 1263, supra note 27, at
192.
215. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 113, at
8 (reporting fears that indexation "might reduce the public resolve to prevent
inflation"); Wetzler, supra note 38, at 425 (reporting that Congress defeated in-
dexation of capital gains in 1978 in part on basis of "the somewhat speculative
argument that indexing, by cushioning people from the ill effects of inflation,
would deplete the ranks of dedicated inflation fighters").
216. See Halperin & Steuerle, supra note 42, at 379 (comments of Richard
A. Musgrave); cf. R. WEAVER, supra note 159, at 191-92 (discussing role of "fis-
cal dividend" in congressional consideration of rate bracket indexation).
217. In addition, however, inflation eroded the value of the then-unindexed
personal exemption and standard deduction, thereby increasing the burdens of
taxpayers with very low incomes. This undesirable result undoubtedly helped
to bolster the case for the Code's current indexation of rate brackets, as well
as the level of the personal exemption and the standard deduction.
218. "Stagflation" is "[a] word recently coined to describe the simultaneous
occurrence of economic slowdown, with its concomitant increased unemploy-
ment (stagnation), and rising prices (inflation)." D. MOFFAT, supra note 14, at
1989] 1287
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [l
atively low levels of capital investment. A policy of seeking,
through "automatic stabilizers" in the tax code, to dampen ag-
gregate demand by increasing the relative tax burden on in-
come from capital thus seems questionable on macroeconomic
grounds.21 9
A policy of reliance on automatic stabilizers may be more
defensible on political grounds. By virtue of their relative polit-
ical strength, groups earning income from equity-financed capi-
tal-including the nation's large manufacturing concerns-may
prove especially influential in promoting anti-inflationary poli-
cies. The same groups, however, might also prove especially in-
fluential, in the event of high inflation, in changing the tax
rules to lessen the burden on income from capital, thus raising
a special danger of legislative instability in the absence of in-
dexation. Even if Congress were to index the tax system fully,
moreover, capital-owning groups probably would remain a sig-
nificant lobby for anti-inflationary policies, as a result of infla-
tion's tendency to induce restrictive monetary policies, thus
dampening demand for the products of capital.
Some purely symbolic implications of indexing may
strengthen the political stabilizer argument. Historically,
policymakers probably have associated "indexing" as a generic
concept with political systems in which traditional anti-infla-
tionary policies have failed fairly spectacularly.220 The further
introduction of indexation measures into the tax system might
raise the view that the United States had weakened in its re-
solve to combat inflation. This perception apparently did not
arise, however, following the 1981 Act's indexation of rate
brackets, and it seems unlikely that the modest changes recom-
mended in this Article would have a serious symbolic effect. In
sum, although a desire for political automatic stabilizers may
provide a reasonable argument against full indexation of the
tax base, the strength of the argument probably is limited.
283; cf. Norris, Stagflation Fears Rise on Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21,
1989, at D12 (describing recent fears of possible recurrence of stagflation).
219. "If inflation occurs only when unemployment is low, [an unindexed]
tax system may ... moderate inflation by curtailing excessive demand. If in-
flation occurs during recession, however, the automatic rise in taxes aggra-
vates rather than moderates declines in output and unemployment." Bailey,
supra note 212, at 313.
220. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 212, at 314 (describing, but ultimately dis-
counting, argument that "tlo index the tax system has often been equated
with a confession of defeat in the attempt to control inflation"); see also C.
STEUERLE, supra note 122, at 35 (attributing historical failure to index tax base
for inflation, in part, on "a political fear of all issues of indexing").
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d. The Argument That an Unindexed System Results in More
Frequent Improvements to the Code
At times, the idea has arisen that while a lack of indexa-
tion concededly breeds legislative instability, the instability
serves a useful social function by providing legislators with fre-
quent opportunities to improve the tax system.22 1 This argu-
ment implies a teleological view of the tax policy process,
according to which successive changes can be expected to lead
the tax system progressively toward a more nearly perfect
state.
The teleological view seems questionable. Two quite differ-
ent conceptions of a theoretically pure tax system have influ-
enced tax policymaking in recent decades: an accretion model
under which the Code subjects all income to taxation regard-
less of the use to which the taxpayer puts the income; and a
consumption model, which subjects to tax only income that the
taxpayer uses to finance consumption during the year.222 Con-
temporary tax legislation can be described most plausibly as an
oscillation between these two polar models, with the tax system
at any given moment showing features of both models.223 Even
the 1986 Act, which in many ways represents a substantial tri-
umph for the accretion model, incorporates some important
consumption-tax elements, most notably continued generous
deductions for retirement savings and the continued exemption
from taxation of the economic returns from home ownership.
It is conceivable that future tax changes may lead inexorably
toward a system closely approximating either the accretion or
consumption-tax ideals. It is also possible, however, that suc-
cessive versions of the Code will represent various "hybrids" of
the two models, with relative weights depending on prevailing
economic and political circumstances. 224 In view of the indeter-
221. Aaron, for example, reports, but does not endorse, this argument:
During inflation Congress ... must act periodically to offset the
effects of rising prices, not only on taxes, but also on expenditures.
The central issue... is whether such periodic reexamination results
in better or worse tax and expenditure policy than would result if au-
tomatic adjustment freed Congress from the need to reexamine these
programs.
Aaron, supra note 135, at 26.
222. For a recent collection of essays focusing on the tension between these
models, see UNEASY COMPROMISE, supra note 42; cf also supra notes 89-92 and
accompanying text (describing absence of need for inflation adjustments in
pure consumption-model system).
223. See Andrews, supra note 9, at 1128-40.
224. "It is not only the current tax that is a hybrid; the inclination of tax
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minacy of this environment, a policy of deliberately building in-
stability into the system, in the hope that this will lead to net
improvement, is not compelling.
The teleological argument against indexation also under-
states the cost of instability in the tax laws as a problem in it-
self. Frequent changes to the Code can generate confusion and
resentment among taxpayers, and can require a great deal of
expensive reeducation among tax administrators and advisers
in both the public and private sectors. Frequent changes make
it impossible for the Treasury to provide current guidance to
practitioners and taxpayers through regulations and rulings,
thus magnifying uncertainty and administrative expense. Per-
haps most importantly, frequent changes in the law deprive the
congressional and Treasury staffs, as well as legislators, of the
time needed to refine the details of legislative changes, a prob-
lem that almost certainly has contributed to shortcomings in
recent legislation. For these reasons, the most frequent appeal
by participants in the legislative process in recent years has
been not for a more "perfect" tax system, but rather for greater
stability in the tax code.2
25
In short, it would seem counterproductive to leave the tax
base unindexed for inflation as a means of inducing more fre-
quent reexaminations of tax legislation. It seem far more desir-
able to build some automatic adjustments for inflation into the
Code, to promote a greater measure of legislative stability than
the Code has seen during the past decade.
B. PROCESS-ORIENTED CAUSES FOR THE ABSENCE OF
INFLATION ADJUSTMENTS
In addition to the substantive concerns just addressed, the
parochial interests of some participants in the legislative
process may have contributed to the rejection of indexation
mechanisms in the past. The existence of these parochial con-
policymakers is also mixed. They show little determination to go all the way
in either direction toward a pure accretion or a pure consumption tax." An-
drews & Bradford, Savings Incentives in a Hybrid Income Tax, in UNEASY
COMPROMISE, supra note 42, at 269, 270 (footnote omitted).
225. See, e.g., Daily Tax Rep., July 14, 1988, at L-1, L-5 (testimony of IRS
Commissioner Lawrence Gibbs before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Con-
sumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Government Operations Commit-
tee) ("We have seen six major tax bills in the last eight years. It is time to
give the IRS and the public a rest from substantial changes to the law that
only add to the confusion."); see also Leonard, Perspectives on the Tax Legisla-
tive Process, 38 TAX NOTES 969, 977 (1988) (pointing to need for stability in tax
system); Verdier, supra note 158, at 174-76 (focusing on need for tax stability).
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cerns in no way detracts from the merits of the substantive ar-
guments that critics have raised against indexation.
Understanding the potential parochial interests nevertheless is
useful for purposes of evaluating previous decisions on inflation
adjustments, as well as for designing proposals that are likely
to receive a favorable legislative reception.
The legislative system's bias against inflation-proof tax
mechanisms seems stronger than substantive concerns alone
can explain. In 1981, for example, legislators rejected a House
Ways and Means Committee proposal for the "expensing" of
many categories of depreciable assets-an inflation-proof
method of providing asset-holders with effective exemption
from taxation 22 -- in favor of a "front-loaded" system, highly
susceptible to the effects of inflation, designed to achieve an ap-
proximately similar result.227 Even more remarkable is the leg-
islative experience of 1982, when Congress, stating explicitly in
the legislative history its goal of providing equipment purchases
with the economic equivalent of "expensing," nevertheless
chose to accomplish this goal through the inflation-sensitive
mechanism of front-loaded depreciation schedules.228 The pat-
226. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
227. The House Ways and Means Committee adopted an explicit expensing
proposal, H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-89 (1981), but Congress
defeated it on the House floor. 127 CONG. REC. 18,092-18,188 (1981). Congress
may have rejected expensing out of a desire to provide businesses with relief
even beyond the zero effective tax rates associated with expensing, c.f. supra
note 91, although Congress's prompt effort, in 1981, to correct the 1981 Act's
negative effective tax rates, supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text, sug-
gests that Congress did not seek deliberately, in 1981, to achieve a result more
generous than expensing. Congress also may have been concerned, in 1981,
that the Ways and Means expensing proposal was to be phased in only gradu-
ally. Cf 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 99 (1981) (pointing to both absolute level of
subsidy provided under Ways and Means plan, and its rate of phase-in, as fac-
tors influencing plan's defeat). Had Congress been concerned mainly with the
rate of phase-in, however, it could have retained the expensing approach with
a more rapid implementation. The roots of congressional decisionmaking al-
ways are complex, and this likely was especially true in the fast-changing envi-
ronment of the early 1980s. Nevertheless, it remains worthwhile to consider
why Congress was so resistant to the inflation-proof expensing proposal and,
perhaps more to the point, why advocates of greater incentives for capital for-
mation supported accelerated cost recovery rather than expensing.
228. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
As was true in 1981, see supra note 227, simple hostility to inflation-proof
tax measures was not the only political factor contributing to the rejection of
expensing in 1982. Perhaps most importantly, Congress perceived the 1982 Act
as a relatively limited, "incremental" corrective amendment to the 1981 legis-
lation, and Congress may have been reluctant to reopen the 1981 decision to
adopt ACRS rather than expensing. In addition, a simple move from ACRS to
expensing in 1982 would have involved short-run revenue losses and required
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tern continued in 1986 when business lobbyists failed to support
Treasury I's proposal for indexed depreciation allowances and
capital gains, 229 although these proposals probably would have
resulted in effective rates of taxation on income from capital
that were quite generous, both by reference to historical stan-
dards and by comparison with the unindexed provisions that
Congress ultimately adopted in the 1986 Act.
230
The motivations underlying legislative decisions are com-
plex, and one should draw conclusions concerning the causes of
legislative action only with caution.231 Nevertheless, the appar-
ent aversion to inflation-proof mechanisms, even in 1981 and
1982 when "expensing" seemed a logical response to the pre-
vailing political and economic environment, suggests the pres-
ence of a bias against inflation-proof mechanisms arising from
more than solely substantive concerns.
carefully drawn transitional rules. Cf. Letter from James M. Verdier to
Michael C. Durst (Jan. 19, 1989) at 3 (offering recollection that revenue con-
cerns militated against adoption of expensing in 1982). Nevertheless, it was
within the congressional staff's expertise to draft appropriate phase-in rules,
and the congressional decision to forgo expensing in actuality, while acknowl-
edging its economic desirability, is noteworthy.
229. See McLure, supra note 30, at 1652-56.
230. See McLure & Zodrow, supra note 125, at 51 ("In light of the outcry
prompted by the Treasury I proposal to index capital gains against inflation
and tax them at a maximum rate of 35 percent, the agreement under the 1986
Act to tax gains at a 33 percent maximum rate without indexing for inflation
is quite amazing.").
With respect to the reaction to Treasury I's proposal for indexed, "eco-
nomic" depreciation allowances, McLure has observed:
The argument that the real present value of depreciation al-
lowances would be as great under [the Treasury I proposal] as under
[prior law's accelerated allowances] carried less weight with many
business executives than might have been expected. This can proba-
bly be traced to a variety of sources. First, some simply did not un-
derstand the purpose of indexing, which was to prevent the
measurement of real income from being distorted by inflation. Sec-
ond, even those who clearly understood the economics of [the Treas-
ury I proposal] did not necessarily prefer it to [prior law]. This
suggests that economists' models that focus attention on real present
values and exclude consideration of up-front cash flow may fail to
capture real-world decision making.
McLure, supra note 30, at 1654 (footnote omitted); see also Minarik, supra
note 185, at 1367 (reporting that in response to Treasury I, "[t]he investment
community railed against nonaccelerated indexed depreciation, asking for big-
ger up-front deductions that were not contingent upon inflation").
231. For a recent attempt to catalog factors influencing legislative decision-
making on proposals for indexation, of spending programs as well as tax rules,
see R. WEAVER, supra note 159, at 1-37, 211-47.
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1. The Possibility That Indexation May Limit Opportunities
for Political Compromise
One source of bias against an inflation-proof tax system
may be an aversion among participants in the legislative bar-
gaining process to "economically" as opposed to "politically" de-
termined policies.232
Risk-averse policymakers (both legislators and lobbyists)
almost certainly would prefer an environment in which they
can conduct political battles along a continuum of possible out-
comes, rather than one in which the only apparent possible out-
comes are wholesale success or failure for their clients (and for
themselves). 233 Policymakers probably have viewed inflation
adjustment as a discontinuous policy tool,234 in the sense that
the institution or removal of indexation can lead to very large
changes in the effective rate of taxation on income from capital.
The same probably has been true with respect to indexation's
possible substitute, "expensing" of depreciable assets, especially
if policymakers have perceived expensing as an alternative to
economic depreciation in a universe admitting of only two pos-
sible solutions. Policymakers therefore may have tended to
avoid indexation and expensing in favor of the more familiar
expedients of the front-loaded depreciation schedule and the
capital gains exclusion ratio, both of which policymakers proba-
bly perceive as "nontheoretical" policies admitting of gradual
adjustment along a continuum.
The perception of inflation-proof structures as inconsistent
with political compromise is, as an economic matter, patently
erroneous. Congress can combine "expensing" with economic
depreciation to provide any desired level of inflation-proof in-
vestment incentive-for example, by allowing expensing of half
of an asset's cost and economic depreciation of the rest.235 Sim-
ilarly, Congress can provide any desired level of preference for
capital gains in an inflation-proof manner, simply by applying a
reduced tax rate to inflation-adjusted gains.236 Over time, tax
232. See infra note 239.
233. For example, proponents of generous depreciation deductions may
have perceived the 1986 Act's allowances, with their attempted ex ante infla-
tion adjustments, as less of a long-term political setback than an economically
similar policy of economic depreciation with explicit indexation for inflation.
234. See, e.g., Bristol, supra note 34, at 1028 ("Indexing, beyond that of
brackets and exemptions, is seen as a complicated process requiring 'all or
none' type decisions.").
235. See supra note 92.
236. For example, Congress might simply provide that after adjustment for
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policymakers may acquire a more sophisticated understanding
of inflation adjustment, including an understanding of the flex-
ibility of inflation-proof mechanisms. This economic education
is likely to occur slowly, however, and a perception that infla-
tion adjustment is largely inconsistent with political compro-
mise may impede consideration of tax indexation measures in
the foreseeable future.
To the extent that this is true, the safety-valve approach
suggested in this Article may prove especially attractive. Under
a safety-valve approach, policymakers would arrive at their un-
derlying depreciation and capital gain policies through political
compromise, without reliance on explicit inflation adjustments.
The presence of the safety valve, however, would preserve
the political result should inflation exceed the range political
negotiators apparently assumed in reaching their original
compromise.
2. Political Actors' Interest in Continuous Change Per Se
Recent discussions of "rent seeking" behavior by partici-
pants in the tax legislative process suggest an additional source
of opposition to inflation adjustment mechanisms. 237 These dis-
cussions focus on the fact that legislators and lobbyists derive
their compensation-whether in the form of professional fees,
campaign contributions, or political influence-from the process
of legislative change, rather than from any particular political
outcome. If this model is correct, these participants have an in-
centive to avoid legislative measures, such as inflation adjust-
ments, that tend to insulate the tax code from potentially
destabilizing influences. 238
inflation, long-term capital gains would be taxed at 75% of the regular tax
rate. See S. 171, supra note 181 (proposing to combine safety-valve indexation
with 50% exclusion ratio).
237. See generally G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANA-
LYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 33 (1980); Buchanan, Tax
Reform as Political Choice, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 32-34 (1987); Doernberg &
McChesney, supra note 156; Doernberg & McChesney, Book Review, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 896-900 (1987) (reviewing J. BIRNBAUM & A. MURRAY,
supra note 62).
238. The rents of political agents are related ... to the frequency of
political change, most notably changes in the patterns of spending and
taxing. Long-term stability in fiscal structure is a highly desirable
feature for institutional efficiency because of the reduced costs of tax-
payer-beneficiary adjustments. In this sense, an old tax is, indeed, a
"good" tax. But such long-term stability need not be in the interests
of those who make decisions as [political] agents, especially when elec-
toral turnover is allowed as a means of shifting the set of agents. At
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The grounding of indexing and expensing directly in eco-
nomic theory may in itself render these measures unattractive
to the "rent seeking" participant in the political process. Policy
tools based explicitly on economic models promote the image of
a tax policy adhering closely to objectively applied external cri-
teria. The alternative image is of a tax policy based on a contin-
uous process of political "horse trading" 23 9-- an image that may
be attractive to professional horse-traders.
The rent-seeking model paints only a partial picture of the
legislative process. 240 Even if the model has only limited ex-
planatory power, however, it suggests that the tax code has
more built-in instability than purely normative considerations
warrant. Recognition of the rent-seeking model therefore ren-
ders more attractive those measures that, like safety-valve in-
dexation, might serve to limit occasions for legislative
revision.241
IV. SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED
SAFETY VALVE AND THE REQUIRED
ELECTION
A. BASiC STRUCTURE OF THE SAFETY VALVE
This Article has suggested an approach to inflation adjust-
the date of any initial change toward favored treatment, agents have
an interest in conveying the idea that changes are permanent. Once
in place, however, any part of the structure is vulnerable to the temp-
tation of agents to renege on the earlier "promise" of permanency.
Buchanan, supra note 237, at 33; cf. R. WEAVER, supra note 159, at 4-5 ("In the
absence of indexing, programs with inflation-sensitive provisions are almost
guaranteed a place on the agenda; certainly their clienteles have a powerful
incentive to press for their consideration. In the case of indexed programs,
however, opponents of change-upward or downward-have a strategic advan-
tage."). Weaver generally describes legislative decisionmaking concerning in-
dexing by reference to legislators' desire both to claim credit for benefits
conferred on constituents, and to avoid blame for detriments suffered by con-
stituents. See id& at 211. The possibility raised in the text, that policymakers
have tended to avoid inflation-proof tax measures in part because of an inter-
est in legislative instability, implies that policymakers see greater benefit in
claiming credit for periodic "corrections" to inflation-induced distortions than
in avoiding blame for the periodic occurrence of these distortions.
239. Cf Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 75, at 81-82 (contrasting notions of
"economic" and "politically determined" depreciation allowances).
240. "The problem with all single-objective theories of politicians' behavior
is not that they are altogether wrong, but that they are incomplete." R.
WEAVER, supra note 159, at 211.
241. In this sense, one can view inflation-adjustment mechanisms as "con-
stitutional rules" of the kind advocated by Brennan and Buchanan. See G.
BRENNAN & J. BucHANAN, supra note 237, at 1-12.
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ment consisting of three central elements. First, Congress
would permit taxpayers to adjust depreciation allowances and
capital gains to compensate for inflation, but only to the extent
that inflation exceeds a "trigger" rate, set slightly higher than
the rate assumed in drafting the underlying tax act.242 Second,
to limit revenue costs and provide some level of "automatic sta-
bilizer," Congress would permit adjustments for only a portion
of the extent to which inflation exceeds the trigger rate.
2 43
Third, the proposed indexation of depreciation and capital gains
would be available only to taxpayers who accept a partial disal-
lowance of the deduction for interest on all of their
indebtedness. 244
The choice of a trigger rate, and the portion of inflation
above the trigger rate for which Congress would provide adjust-
ment, would be matters of economic and political judgment.
The House proposal in 1985 would have permitted adjustments
to depreciation allowances by half of the extent to which infla-
tion exceeded five percent during the year245 -adjustments
which arguably are too limited. For purposes of illustration
only, the following discussion assumes that the Code would al-
low the taxpayer adjustment for seventy-five percent of the ex-
tent to which inflation exceeds a trigger rate of five percent.
Mechanically, with respect to depreciation, the system pro-
posed in this Article would permit taxpayers to multiply the
depreciation allowance otherwise permitted for the taxable
year by the factor of one plus seventy-five percent of the extent
to which the inflation rate (expressed in decimal form) exceeds
five percent during the year. For example, if inflation were to
occur during the taxable year at the rate of eight percent, the
taxpayer would multiply the otherwise permitted allowance by
a factor of 1 + [.75 X (.08 - .05)], or 1.0225.246 Because the ef-
fects of inflation are cumulative throughout a depreciable as-
set's life, the proposed safety-valve adjustments also would be
cumulative.2 4 7 Thus, if inflation in the first year of an asset's
life were to occur at a rate of eight percent (resulting in an ad-
justment factor of two and one-quarter percent), and if infla-
242. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 114.
246. That is, the taxpayer would be able to increase the allowance by 2.25
percent.
247. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 57, at 154-55 (incorporating cumula-
tive adjustments into 1985 House safety-valve proposal for depreciation).
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tion again were to occur at a rate of eight percent during the
second year, the adjustment factor for the second year would be
1.0225 X 1.0225, resulting in an adjustment factor of 1.0455.
A safety-valve adjustment to capital gains would consist of
a one-time increase in basis in the year in which the taxpayer
sells the asset, which would reflect the extent to which "ex-
cess" inflation had occurred during the asset's holding period.
Assume, for example, that during an asset's three-year holding
period, inflation occurred at a rate of eight percent in the first
year, five percent in the second year, and ten percent in the
third year. In computing the asset's adjusted basis for purposes
of determing the gain on sale, the taxpayer would multiply the
basis by a factor of 1.0225, reflecting the eight-percent inflation
in the first year,248 and also by a factor of 1.0375, reflecting the
ten-percent inflation in the third year.249 No adjustments
would be allowed for the second year, in which inflation did not
exceed five percent. The total adjustment factor thus would be
1.0225 X 1.0375 (reflecting the cumulative effect of inflation
above the trigger over the asset's life), or 1.0608. Therefore, if
the asset had an adjusted basis in the year of purchase of $100,
its inflation-adjusted basis at the end of the three-year holding
period would be $106.08.
B. SOME ADDITIONAL MATTERS OF TECHNICAL DESIGN
Because the proposed safety-valve indexation of deprecia-
tion conforms depreciation deductions more closely to economic
reality, the Code generally should treat the adjustments as ad-
ditions to "depreciation" for purposes of those portions of the
Code to which depreciation allowances are relevant.250 For ex-
ample, Congress should allow the proposed safety-valve adjust-
ments in computing depreciation for minimum tax purposes,
251
as well as in computing a corporation's "earnings and prof-
its." 252 This extension of the proposed indexation is not essen-
248. This example retains the assumption that Congress would design the
safety-valve indexation to compensate for 75% of the extent to which inflation
exceeds five percent per year.
249. The adjustment factor for a year in which inflation occurs at a rate of
10% is 1 + [0.75 X (.10 - .05)], or 1.0375.
250. See H. Calkins & M. Durst, supra note 74, at 12.
251. Id In computing alternative minimum taxable income, Congress gen-
erally allows taxpayers depreciation according to schedules somewhat less ac-
celerated than those that apply in computing regular taxable income. I.R.C.
§ 56(g)(4) (West 1989).
252. Generally, a corporation's "earnings and profits" represent a measure
of the corporation's retained earnings, the distribution of which will result in a
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tial, however, and Congress might decide, for purposes of
administrative simplicity, to limit the applicability of the pro-
posed depreciation adjustments only to the computation of a
taxpayer's regular taxable income.253
The Code provides generally that a taxpayer must reduce
an asset's basis by the amount of any depreciation deduction al-
lowed for the asset, to reflect that the taxpayer has "recovered"
a portion of the asset's original cost through depreciation. 254
The reduction in basis can result in additional taxable gain if
the taxpayer later sells the depreciable asset prior to its ex-
haustion.255 The question arises whether the additional depre-
ciation deductions resulting from safety-valve indexation
should, like regular depreciation deductions, result in reduc-
tions of the depreciable asset's basis.
The answer should depend on whether gain on the sale of
the depreciable asset is eligible for safety-valve indexation. If
the additional depreciation deductions attributable to indexa-
tion result in reductions in the asset's basis, but the taxpayer is
not permitted to index gain on the sale of the asset, the tax-
payer could face an unwarranted increase in taxable gain on
the sale. If the taxpayer is permitted to index gain on the sale
of the depreciable asset, however, the additional depreciation
allowances resulting from safety-valve indexation should re-
duce asset basis. The 1985 House proposal did not subject gains
on asset dispositions to indexation, and the 1985 proposal ac-
cordingly did not require the taxpayer to reduce asset basis by
the additional depreciation deductions attributable to indexa-
dividend to the shareholder. I.R.C. § 316(a) (West 1989). In computing earn-
ings and profits, the Code allows a corporation depreciation deductions less ac-
celerated than those allowed in computing taxable income. I.R.C. § 312(k)
(West 1989).
253. The 1985 House proposal did not allow safety-valve indexation in some
circumstances in which the Code subjects assets to depreciation under special
rules, for example, when assets are used outside the United States. See H.R.
REP. No. 426, supra note 57, at 154. As a general matter, however, the House
proposal treated its proposed inflation adjustments as additional "deprecia-
tion" deductions for purposes of all portions of the Code. I- at 155.
254. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (West 1989). In essence, the Code views the taking
of a depreciation deduction as a "sale" of the worn-out portion of the asset for
zero consideration, resulting in a deductible "loss"; that is, the amount of the
depreciation allowance. Under traditional tax principles, the allowance of a
deductible loss should result in a reduction of asset basis.
255. The taxable gain on the sale of a depreciable asset is equal to the dif-
ference between the amount received on sale of the asset and the asset's ad-
justed basis. I.R.C. § 1001 (West 1989). Thus, a reduction in asset basis as a
result of depreciation allowances can increase the amount of gain recognized
on the asset's sale.
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tion.25 6  For administrative simplicity, Congress probably
should retain this approach.25 7
Congress should not permit the proposed indexation of a
capital asset's basis to the extent that it results in a capital
loss. 258 Allowing indexation even when it results in a capital
loss could exacerbate the distortion currently arising from a
taxpayer's ability to recognize capital losses at the taxpayer's
discretion by disposing of assets with unrealized losses, while
deferring, and perhaps avoiding entirely, the taxation of capital
gains by retaining assets with unrealized gain.2 5 9
The proposal to condition indexation on the taxpayer's
election to limit interest deductions raises a need for rules ad-
dressing business entities under common control. It might be
possible, for example, for a taxpayer to establish two corpora-
tions, one to hold and operate the taxpayer's depreciable assets
and the other to serve as obligor on loans to finance the tax-
payer's business operations. If the Code is to permit the asset-
holding corporation to benefit from safety-valve indexation of
depreciation or capital gains, it should require the debtor corpo-
ration to elect the partial disallowance of interest deductions.
Congress can address this and similar problems by permit-
ting a taxpayer to participate in safety-valve indexation only if
all related taxpayers, including entities related by common
ownership, also elect into the system. The degree of common
256. See H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 57, at 155.
257. The principles applied in reaching this decision also could help resolve
some other technical problems of depreciation indexation. For example, de-
preciation allowances on assets of a partnership result in reductions of a part-
ner's basis in the partner's partnership interest. A partner's basis in a
partnership interest generally is referred to as an "outside" basis, to distin-
guish it from the partnership's "inside" basis in the assets held by the partner-
ship. See 1 A. WILLIS, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 21.01 (2d ed. 1976). Similar
situations can arise with respect to shareholders' interests in S corporations,
and parent corporations' interests in the stock of subsidiaries. See generally
STAFF OF THE JOINT COhMI. ON TAXATION, supra note 113, at 64-65 (discussing
problems of inflation adjustments for assets held by pass-through entities). As
a general matter, Congress should keep indexing rules consistent for both in-
side and outside basis. For example, if the Code permits partnerships to index
depreciation allowances, thereby resulting in larger reductions of "inside" as-
set basis each year than would occur in the absence of indexation, it should
allow partners to index capital gains on the sale of partnership interests.
258. Cf. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 113, at 39-40
(recommending that taxpayers not be permitted to index asset basis to extent
indexation results in taxable loss). But cf. supra note 191 (describing recent
legislative change permitting indexation to result in losses under British in-
dexing system).
259. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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ownership required for entities to be deemed "related" for pur-
poses of this rule should depend upon congressional judgment
concerning the likelihood that safety-valve indexation would, in
fact, induce tax avoidance transactions among related entities.
The Code currently contains several models of "related entity"
provisions on which Congress could rely.260
By requiring the partial disallowance of the taxpayer's to-
tal deductions for "interest," the election suggested here would
pose an additional incentive for taxpayers to recharacterize in-
terest expenses as some form of expenditure carrying another
label but serving the same economic function as interest. The
Code already poses substantial incentives of this kind by disal-
lowing interest deductions in a number of contexts, and the tax
law has adapted in response to this problem in a number of re-
spects.261 The election suggested here might not add signifi-
cantly to the incentives for recharacterization that already
exist. Nevertheless, Congress should recognize that the elec-
tion could raise the need for additional policing of attempts to
classify debt transactions under some other label.
Congress could limit the potential administrative burdens
of the proposed system by providing fairly generous de
minimis exceptions. 2 62 For example, Congress might permit
taxpayers with capital gains not exceeding $5,000 to index these
amounts without electing a partial disallowance of interest de-
ductions.2 63 In addition, Congress almost certainly would ex-
empt "qualified residence interest" (home mortgage interest)264
260. The Code defines "related" entities differently for different purposes.
For example, §§ 267 and 318 provide that entities with 50% common ownership
will be considered related for purposes of most of the Code's anti-avoidance
rules. See I.R.C. § 267 (West 1989) (disallowing losses in transactions between
related taxpayers); Id § 318 (defining "constructive ownership of stock" for
purposes of various rules aimed at curtailing tax avoidance schemes among re-
lated corportions). Section 168(f)(5), in contrast, considers entities with 10%
common ownership to be related for purposes of preventing taxpayers from
first selling and then reacquiring depreciable property in order to qualify that
property for depreciation under liberalized rules. See I.R.C. § 168(f)(5) (West
1989).
261. Cf. supra note 193 (indicating some areas in which Code currently lim-
its interest deductions). For discussion of this topic, see Shakow, supra note
193, at 32-50; 2 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 198-99.
262. Cf. 1 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 114 (providing $5,000 de
minimis exception to interest indexation proposal).
263. The Code's current allowance of a limited amount of "expensing" for
small business taxpayers under § 179 might preclude the need for a similar de
minimis rule for depreciation. See supra note 89.
264. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 1989).
1300 [V7ol. 73:1217
INFLATION AND THE TAX CODE
from the partial disallowance.265
The current discussion cannot seek realistically to identify
all potential complexities of safety-valve indexation, and it is
likely that some unforeseen difficulties will arise after the pro-
gram is implemented. As a general matter, however, the com-
plexities the proposal raises are of familiar kinds, and Congress
should be able to resolve them by following existing statutory
models. The suggested election mechanism addresses the most
daunting difficulty: the need to "trace" or otherwise attribute a
taxpayer's debt to particular depreciable or capital assets. The
complexities of safety-valve indexation, moreover, would very
possibly be far less serious than the potential distortions, both
political and economic, of leaving the Code entirely unprotected
from a future resurgence of rapid inflation.
CONCLUSION
Although analysts have long recognized that a failure to in-
dex the tax base for inflation can lead to large increases in the
tax burden on income from capital, a number of concerns have
stymied proposals to redress this defect. To some extent, these
concerns reflect serious normative arguments against indexa-
tion, most notably including a recognition of the need to find
some practicable means of limiting the indexation afforded
holders of debt-financed assets. In addition to the normative
concerns, a political aversion to explicit inflation protection,
which has arisen partly from causes largely unrelated to index-
ation's intrinsic merits, has blocked consideration of inflation
adjustment mechanisms.
This Article has argued that these historical impediments
to inflation adjustment need not preclude the introduction to
the Code of a useful degree of inflation protection. Congress
can alleviate many of the complexities that critics have feared
in the past by a straightforward election which effectively
would limit full inflation adjustments to holders of equity-fi-
nanced assets. Congress can address many of the other sub-
stantive and political barriers to indexing by limiting explicit
indexation only to periods in which the tax effects of inflation
pose an especially serious threat to both economic growth and
legislative stability.
At the time of this writing, inflation remains relatively
265. Cf. 1 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 2, at 114 (excluding personal
residence interest from Treasury I interest indexation proposal).
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low, but the possibility of resurgent inflation cannot be ruled
out. The tax burden on capital remains a serious economic and
political concern, and members of Congress, tax administrators,
and practitioners are adamant in their desire for stability in the
Code. The current environment therefore may present an ex-
cellent opportunity for placing in the Code inflation adjust-
ments that would be of little consequence now, but which could
prevent a great deal of needless dislocation should inflation ac-
celerate in the future.
